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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the U.S. saw 57,472 instances of gun violence, kill-
ing nearly 15,000 people and injuring twice that number.' And
yet Congress has been singularly unable to enact legislation to
reduce this violence. For example, after the 2018 shooting at
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School President Donald
Trump promised to "never let this happen again." 2 In spite of the
president's promise, Congress has refused to even hold hearings
on gun violence, preventing even the first step in the legislative
process from happening. 3
The majority of Americans favor some sort of gun control.4
Yet, for various reasons, ranging from politics to the Constitu-
tion to the state in which they live, they are unlikely to see it.5
The difficulty of enacting federal gun legislation is longstanding,
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1. Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, http://www
.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls [https://perma.cc/QF4C-VH99]. Those num-
bers do not include an estimated 20,000 suicides. Id.
2. Susan Jaffe, Gun Violence Research in the USA: The CDC's Impasse,
391 LANCET 2487, 2487 (2018).
3. Id.
4. Robert Richards, The Role of Interest Groups and Group Interests on
Gun Legislation in the U.S. House, 98 SoC. SCI. Q. 471, 480 (2017).
5. Id. at 471-72.
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not new to the contemporary polarized political climate. The fed-
eral government enacted its first significant gun control laws be-
tween the two World Wars. 6 Even that trio of laws proved less
effective than lawmakers had hoped.7 For state or federal legis-
latures to effectively regulate guns, both have to consider the
contours of the Second Amendment, which imposes significant
restrictions on the permissible reach of firearm regulation while,
at the same time, leaves the scope of those restrictions ambigu-
OUS. 8
For individuals worried about the costs of gun violence, Con-
gress's inability to directly regulate firearms means they need to
find an alternative approach to reduce these costs. One possibil-
ity is through a Pigouvian tax. Pigouvian taxes are "[c]orrective
taxes . .. that are designed primarily to change behavior rather
than raise revenue."9
Using taxes to regulate gun ownership and use is not a new
idea. Commentators have pointed out that taxes can potentially
break the regulatory logjam that gun legislation has faced. Some
have suggested that sales taxes on guns may "have an important
effect on gun sales, use, and misuse."' 0 Others propose that prop-
erty-style taxes on gun ownership, determined by the likelihood
that the taxpayer's gun will do harm, may encourage safer be-
havior by gun owners."
Among academics, using taxes to indirectly regulate what
the government is incapable of directly regulating has grown in-
creasingly popular in recent years. 12 Its popularity masks a sig-
nificant problem with using Pigouvian taxes in place of com-
mand-and-control regulation: where the cost of an activity varies
among those engaged in the activity, it is difficult to use Pigou-
6. Carol Skalnik Leff & Mark H. Leff, The Politics of Ineffectiveness: Fed-
eral Firearms Legislation, 1919-38, 455 ANNALS 48, 49 (1981).
7. Id. at 56-57.
8. See infra Part II.
9. Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2015).
10. Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control after Heller: Threats and Sideshows
from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLAL. REV. 1041, 1086 (2009).
11. Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, 'Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy": An
Economic Analysis of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
91, 98-99 (1996).
12. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 1675-76.
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vian taxes to arrive at "an optimal allocation of economic re-
sources." 13 Professor Victor Fleischer points to Pigouvian taxes
on guns as among the least promising applications of Pigouvian
taxes because the costs imposed on society by individual gun
owners vary widely. 14
In this Article, I propose a tax regime for firearms. At the
same time, I take Professor Fleischer's skepticism of firearms
taxes as an effective regulatory regime seriously. This Article's
purpose is more modest than using a Pigouvian tax to fundamen-
tally change gun owners' behavior. Instead, my tax proposal here
is meant to compensate society for the negative externalities
caused by gun violence.
The firearms tax I propose, then, is almost the inverse of a
Pigouvian tax. Rather than change behavior, it is intended to
raise revenue for a particular purpose. In the course of raising
revenue, the firearms tax will cause gun owners to internalize
more of the cost of gun ownership and may, on the margins, af-
fect their behavior. Any such behavioral change would be inci-
dental, however, to the tax's primary purpose of making society
financially whole. That is, while the reduction of gun violence is
an urgent goal, it is not the goal of this particular proposal, and
my proposed firearms tax regime will not have failed even if it
did nothing to stem the scourge of gun violence.
The imposition of a firearms tax is not meant to replace the
appropriate regulation of guns. In fact, legislation that reduces
gun violence will reduce the costs society bears for that gun vio-
lence, in turn reducing the need for a firearms tax. Without gun
violence, there would be virtually no externalities that needed
recompense. The appropriate gun legislation, then, could obviate
the need for this tax. Until then, though, a firearms tax will al-
low the victims of gun violence to be made (financially) whole.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I will provide a
foundation for why the government might want to impose a tax
on firearms. It will discuss both the scope and the categories of
gun violence-related costs in the United States.
Part II will then go through the history of current jurispru-
dence surrounding the Second Amendment. Through most of the
history of the Second Amendment the question of whether the
right to bear arms was an individual right or a collective one,
13. Id. at 1676-77.
14. Id. at 1677.
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tied to militia service, continued unresolved. In 2008, the Su-
preme Court definitively held that the right to bear arms was an
individual right, albeit not an absolute right. 15 In subsequent
years, lower courts have worked to establish where the line di-
viding permissible from impermissible limitations on that right
lies. Part II will trace those cases and the lines they have drawn.
Part III will introduce Pigouvian taxes as a regulatory tool
and as a method to counteract negative externalities. It will pro-
vide examples of different types of Pigouvian taxes, as well as
arguments for and against them.
Part IV will discuss a number of constraints that the Con-
stitution places on a firearms tax. Naturally, the Second Amend-
ment comes into play, but a firearms tax must also comply with
the Constitution's Taxing Clause, and it requires consideration
of the Takings Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Finally, having gone through both the purpose of and the
constitutional constraints on any firearms tax, Part V will dis-
cuss how a firearms tax regime should look. It will go over both
the form-an excise and a property tax-and the rate. It will also
discuss how the revenue raised by the tax should be allocated,
and finally, it discusses some potential behavioral effects of a
firearms tax.
Well-designed, a firearms tax will reimburse society for the
social costs of gun violence. The tax must be designed with reve-
nue, expenditures, and the Constitution in mind, and its pur-
pose-reimbursing society, not banning guns-must always be
in the forefront of legislators' minds. Drafted appropriately,
though, this tax would shift at least a significant portion of the
cost of gun violence off of society and back to gun owners, who
should bear those costs.
I. GUN VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Gun violence is expensive. It can be difficult, however, to
quantify the cost and to determine who bears it. In part, this is
because the costs range from the purely financial to the purely
personal. This Part will lay out three categories of costs imposed
by gun violence and discuss estimates of how much they cost.
The Part will then demonstrate that, while it may be difficult to
15. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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determine exactly who bears which costs, taxpayers bear a sig-
nificant amount of firearm-related costs.
In 2016, 38,658 people died from firearm-related injuries in
the United States. 16 On top of that, the U.S. saw 116,414 nonfa-
tal injuries.1 7 While those numbers are sobering on their own,18
these deaths and injuries come with financial costs. Calculating
those costs can be difficult, though. Different analyses use
"widely differing accounting principles and procedures." 19
For purposes of this analysis, though, there are three main
categories of costs that derive from gun violence: the cost of per-
sonal injury and death, the cost of damage to property, and the
cost of first responders.
The costs associated with injury and death can be difficult
to quantify. But, while difficult, we quantify those numbers on a
daily basis. Both tort law and administrative regulations have
procedures for determining the value of a life, though their pro-
cedures differ.20 Both attempt, however, to take into account the
direct and the indirect costs of death or injury.21 Direct costs in-
clude primarily medical care, while indirect costs "stem from the
reduced productivity of victims, measured in the labor market
by earnings." 22 While the specifics of how to calculate these di-
rect and (especially) indirect costs are outside the scope of this
16. WISQARS Fatal Injury Data, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION (Jan. 18, 2019), https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html
[https://perma.cc/3HST-TPNE]; see also Christine Hauser, Gun Death Rate Rose
Again in 2016, C.D.C. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/11/04/us/gun-death-rates.html.
17. WISQARS Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2000- 2016, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates.html
[https://perma.cc/5E9V-WP24].
18. These numbers are also unique among developed economies. The U.S.
murder rate of 5.5 murders per 100,000 people is triple the murder rate in Can-
ada, France, and the U.K., and five times the rate in Italy, Germany, and Spain.
William N. Evans et al., Guns and Violence: The Enduring Impact of Crack Co-
caine Markets on Young Black Males (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24819, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24819 [https://perma.cc/
2XKY-BGVQ].
19. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 45
(2000).
20. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 537, 538 (2005).
21. COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 19, at 50.
22. Id.
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article, gunshot victims certainly face medical bills and lost
wages.2 3 However calculated, those costs may be significant.
And costs may fall, in no small part, on taxpayers broadly.
To the extent the victim has assets herself, or has insurance, or
can recover damages from the shooter in tort, she can personally
bear the costs of her medical care. But where she is uninsured or
on public insurance, taxpayers bear at least a portion of the costs
of her medical care. An Urban Institute study of firearm injuries
in six states found that in each state, more than sixty percent of
the hospital costs were incurred by people either without insur-
ance or with public insurance. 2 4
The six states the Urban Institute chose to look at are not
representative of the country as a whole; all six have higher-
than-average rates of armed robbery, and four of the six have
higher-than-average rates of gun homicide. 25 Still, the govern-
ment is likely to bear a significant portion of the cost of care for
firearm injuries in other states, too. On average, the government
offsets about sixty-five percent of medical providers' uncompen-
sated care. 26 As long as some percentage of shooting victims are
uninsured or have public insurance, the government will bear a
significant portion of the direct costs of gun violence. And if the
government bears the cost, its incidence ultimately falls on tax-
payers.27
23. Those bills are often significant. Several victims of the October 1, 2017,
mass shooting in Las Vegas, for example, turned to crowdfunding to try to de-
fray some of the costs of medical treatment and future lost wages. See, e.g., Anna
Almendrala, Las Vegas Shooting Victims Are Turning to GoFundMe for Help
with Medical Bills, HUFFPOST (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost
.comlentry/vegas-shooting-victims-crowdfunding-us_59f3a5be4bO7fdc
5fbe465c [https://perma.cc/TBN8-BPTH].
24. EMBRY HOWELL ET AL., STATE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL USE AND COST
OF FIREARM ASSAULT INJURY, 2010, at 6 (2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/22881/413210-state-variation-in-hospital-use-and-cost
-of-firearm-assault-injury-.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JS4-VT4G]. The six states the
Urban Institute study looked at were Arizona, California, Maryland, New Jer-
sey, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Teresa A. Coughlin et al., An Estimated $84.9 Billion in Uncompen-
sated Care Was Provided in 2013; ACA Payment Cuts Could Challenge Provid-
ers, 33 HEALTH AFF. 807, 812 (2014).
27. EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: How GOVERN-
MENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY xxi (2015) ("[Elvery decision by government
to spend money necessarily requires an offsetting commitment to raise the rev-
enues to pay for that spending.").
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The second category of costs are the costs of property dam-
aged by firearms. Whether or not gun violence results in injury
or death, it can damage property. Anecdotally, it appears that
property damage is more common than injury and death. For ex-
ample, during the first two months of 2018, Nashville saw sev-
enteen homicides and fifty-five injuries from gunfire. 28 During
the same period, there were 104 reports of property damage from
gunfire, almost double the number of injuries, and more than six
times the number of homicides. 29 Similarly, in Aurora, Illinois, a
Chicago suburb, there were 132 shootings in 2016.30 Six people
died and another forty were injured in those shootings. 31 Mean-
while, in eighty-six shootings there was property damage or
nothing was hit.32
In general, property owners bear the cost of property dam-
age from gun violence. In some cases, though, insurance may
cover part or all of the cost. Some insurers offer personal liability
policies that cover property damage that results from the in-
sured's accidental or self-defense shootings. 33 Without insur-
ance, though, the property-owning victim of the shooting must
either bear the cost of repairs or replacement or must deal with
damaged property.
The third category of costs are the costs of first responders.
Police and firefighters must respond when a shooting occurs. The
cost of the response will depend, among other things, on the
scope and the location of the shooting, but it can be substantial.
Officials in Las Vegas estimated that the October 1, 2017, shoot-
ing at the Route 91 Harvest music festival cost the city at least
$3.5 million for the police response, and another $500,000 for the
28. Julie Edwards, Shootings Resulting in Homicide Up 54 Percent in Nash-
ville Compared to Last Year, WKRN.coM (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.wkrn.com/
news/crime-tracker/shootings-resulting-in-homicide-up-54-percent-in-nashville
-compared-to-last-year_20180326035017797/1077198378 [https://perma.cc/
95R5-J95R].
29. Id.
30. Hannah Leone, Number of Shootings Down, But Gun Violence More
Spread Out in Aurora, AURORA BEACON-NEWS (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www
.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/crime/ct-abn-aurora
-shootings-spread-2016-st-0306-2017032 1-story.html [https://perma.cc/XM6X
-UGAE].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Rob Hillenbrand, Note, Heller on the Threshold: Crafting a Gun Insur-
ance Mandate, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1460 (2015).
2019]1 611
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
fire department, coroner, and social services. 34 The amount
spent on police overtime in response to the shooting represented
half a percent of the Las Vegas police department's annual
budget.35 The costs of this single, albeit devastating, incident
were so steep that the federal government stepped in to reim-
burse the city for overtime costs. 36
Unlike medical costs, taxpayers bear the full cost of first re-
sponders. In 2015, spending on police and corrections constituted
six percent of state and local spending. 37 Since 1996, this cate-
gory of spending has been the "fifth-largest source of direct gen-
eral spending at the state and local level." 3 8 For the two decades
prior, police and corrections spending was the sixth-largest.39 In
total, state and local governments spent $105 billion on police in
2015.40
The important thing about each of these three categories of
costs is that the gun owner does not bear them. Rather, the costs
are imposed on the victims and on society at large. Gun owner-
ship represents a textbook example of a negative externality. 41
Negative externalities are social costs "that are not taken into
34. Ken Ritter, Officials Project Cost of Response to Vegas Shooting at $4M,
LAS VEGAS SUN (Oct. 25, 2017), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/oct/25/
officials-project-cost-of-response-to-vegas-shootil [https://perma.cc/EW79
-XSAW].
35. Id..
36. Gary Martin, Feds Will Reimburse Nevada $2M for Las Vegas Shooting
Costs, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (June 25, 2018), https://www.reviewjournal.com/
crime/shootings/feds-will-reimburse-nevada-2m-for-las-vegas-shooting-costs/
[https://perma.cc/99JU-UHJK].
37. Police and Corrections Expenditures, URB. INST., https://www.urban
.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-fmance-initiative/state
-and-local-backgrounders/police-and-corrections-expenditures [https://perma
.cc/2GJR-S37T].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Phillip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation: Firearms, in
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 78 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) ("If the calcu-
lations presented in our . . . paper are even roughly correct, then the implication
is that gun ownership has a substantial negative externality associated with
it.").
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account by private decision-makers." 42 By imposing costs on oth-
ers, negative externalities encourage inefficient behavior. 43 In
this case, because gun owners do not bear the full cost of owner-
ship, they have an incentive to overconsume guns (e.g., to pur-
chase more than they would if they bore the full cost). 4 4 Moreo-
ver, because they do not bear the full cost of the acquisition of
guns or of the harm imposed on others by guns, they have less
incentive to protect their guns from theft and to otherwise han-
dle their guns safely. 45
How much is the cost associated with gun violence? It is
hard to nail down precisely, since different measures will include
different direct and indirect harms. The total cost depends,
among other things, on which costs are included and on how the
costs are calculated. The cost is significant, though. Recent esti-
mates of the annual economic cost of gun violence in the United
42. Michel Callon, An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Exter-
nalities Revisited by Sociology, 46 Soc. REV. 244, 248 (1998).
43. William H. Sandholm, Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Imple-
mentation, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 885, 885 (2005).
44. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 41, at 75. This societal subsidy may help
explain gun ownership trends in the United States. There are about 1.2 guns
for every resident. Christopher Ingraham, There Are More Guns than People in
the United States, According to a New Study of Global Firearm Ownership,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/there-are-more-guns-than-people-in-the-united
-states-according-to-a-new-study-of-global-firearm-ownership/?utm term=
.748428d0beb9 [https://perma.cc/E8SW-2RF5]. The guns are not evenly distrib-
uted, though: in 2017, Pew found that only forty-two percent of U.S. adults re-
ported either owning a gun or living with someone who owned a gun. KIM PAR-
KER ET AL., AMERICA'S COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH GUNS: AN IN-DEPTH
LOOK AT THE ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES OF U.S. ADULTS 7 (2017). While
there is approximately one gun per U.S. resident, the average gun-owning
household owned 8.1 guns in 2013, double the 4.1 guns it owned in 1994. Chris-
topher Ingraham, The Average Gun Owner Now Owns 8 Guns-Double What It
Used to Be, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.comlnews/wonk/wp/2015/10/21/the-average-gun-owner-now
-owns-8-guns-double-what-it-used-to-be/?utmterm=.b665el5fcf79 [https://
perma.cc/4V4N-GBFR]. While there may be several reasons that gun-owning
households own so many guns, in part, it is because the societal subsidy allows
them to acquire more than they would if they bore the full cost.
45. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 41, at 75.
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States range from $45.6 billion46 to $229 billion.4 7 The precise
number is less important for our current purposes, though, than
is the fact that gun violence imposes significant costs on society
at large. Gun ownership creates significant negative externali-
ties.
Generally speaking, when a government wants to amelio-
rate negative externalities, it has two choices: it can regulate the
activity in question or it can impose a tax. 4 8 Each approach has
advantages and disadvantages. In the case of guns, though,
there may be practical reasons why a tax is a better tool than
regulation to cause gun owners to internalize the costs of gun
violence. The next two Parts will go over those reasons.
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND CONSTRAINTS ON
GUN REGULATION
Even though gun violence imposes significant costs on soci-
ety, legislatures face limits on their ability to respond. This Part
will first discuss the history of Second Amendment jurispru-
dence, leading up to the Supreme Court deciding that the right
to bear arms is an individual, albeit not absolute, right. It will
then discuss the problems legislatures and lower courts have
had in determining the contours of permissible firearm regula-
tion.
When legislatures in the United States consider regulating
guns, they must work within the contours of the Second Amend-
ment. The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 49
For much of U.S. history, it was unclear whether the Second
Amendment provided an individual right, or if it conferred
merely a collective right-that is, as a member of a militia-to
46. Faiz Gani et al., Emergency Department Visits for Firearm-Related In-
juries in the United States, 2006-14, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1729, 1736 (2017).
47. Statistics on the Costs of Gun Violence, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT
GUN VIOLENCE, http://1awcenter.giffords.org/costs-of-gun-violence-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/7XP6-VCKX].
48. Michael Kremer & Jack Willis, Guns, Latrines, and Land Reform: Dy-
namic Pigouvian Taxation, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 83, 83 (2016).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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bear arms.5 0 In its 2008 opinion in D.C. v. Heller,5 ' the Supreme
Court answered the question. D.C. law made it a crime to carry
an unregistered firearm while, at the same time, prohibited the
registration of handguns.5 2 Separately, the law required D.C.
residents to keep their legally-owned guns either unloaded and
disassembled, or disabled by a trigger lock, unless the gun was
located in a place of business or was being used for legal recrea-
tional purposes at the time. 5 3
A resident of D.C. challenged the law after attempting to
register his handgun and having his request denied. 54 The Court
of Appeals held that the Second Amendment conferred an indi-
vidual right to bear arms, and therefore the law violated his Sec-
ond Amendment rights.5 5 The Supreme Court upheld the D.C.
Circuit's decision, embracing the D.C. Circuit's holding that the
right to bear arms was an individual right, separate from and
unrelated to any militia service.5 6
In finding that the right to bear arms was an individual
right, the Court analyzed the relationship between the prefatory
clause and the operative clause of the Second Amendment.5 7 The
operative clause "codifies a 'right of the people,"' which, the
Court said signals an individual, rather than collective, right in
the Constitution.58 Further cementing its point, the Court found
that when the Bill of Rights was drafted, the phrase "'bear arms'
was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons out-
side of an organized militia." 5 9 Putting these strands together,
50. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Second Amendment Rights of Children,
89 IOWA L. REv. 609, 613 (2004).
51. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
52. Id. at 574-75. It did allow individuals to carry handguns if they got a
one-year license from the chief of police. Id. at 575.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 575--76.
55. Id. at 576.
56. Id. at 595 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and
bear arms.").
57. The prefatory clause states, "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State . . . ." Id. at 595 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).
The rest of the Second Amendment constitutes the operative clause. Id.
58. Id. at 579.
59. Id. at 584. It turns out that Justice Scalia was wrong as a historical
matter. In the founding era, "[n]on-military uses of 'bear arms' are not just
rare-they're almost nonexistent." Dennis Baron, Antonin Scalia Was Wrong
6152019]
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the Court held that the Second Amendment conferred an indi-
vidual-albeit limited-right to keep and bear arms.60
What, then, did the Court make of the prefatory clause's in-
vocation of a "well-regulated militia"?6 1 The Court asserted that
historically, tyrants had eliminated militias not by banning
them, but by taking their weapons. 62 Thus, the prefatory clause
announced what had inspired the Amendment's codification-to
prevent the elimination of a militia.63 The prefatory clause does
not, however, signal the sole purpose underlying the Second
Amendment. According to Justice Scalia, most Americans "un-
doubtedly thought [the right to bear arms was] even more im-
portant for self-defense and hunting."64 The Court emphasized
that a right to self-defense is central to the individual right en-
shrined in the Second Amendment.65
The Court's decision in Heller meant that the Second
Amendment limited the federal government's ability to regulate
firearms. It was not immediately clear, however, whether the
Second Amendment was equally applicable to state govern-
ments. Two years later, the Supreme Court gave clarity regard-
ing the Amendment's applicability to the states when it held that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the right to bear arms,
and thus that the Second Amendment applied to state laws.66
The Supreme Court's decision did not foreclose the possibil-
ity of gun regulation. In writing the majority opinion, Justice
Scalia explicitly recognized that there are constitutionally-per-
missible limitations on gun ownership.67 The Court declined to
provide significant contours for these permissible limitations,
though. Instead, it listed a handful of historical limitations that
About the Meaning of "Bear Arms," WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/antonin-scalia-was-wrong-about-the-meaning
-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/9243ac66-5d1 1-1 1e8-b2b8-08a538d9dbd6_story
.html?utmterm=.cf2c5dO29c9e [https://perma.cc/B7TK-NCKC]. Nonetheless,
historically accurate or not, unless Heller is eventually overturned, the Court's
decision is still binding.
60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598.
63. Id. at 599.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 628.
66. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
67. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
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would not violate the Constitution, 68 while emphasizing that an
absolute ban on handguns used for self-defense in the home was
impermissible. 6 9
At the federal level, Heller has been more or less irrelevant.
Even in the wake of high-profile shootings, Congress has been
unable to pass even the most basic and uncontroversial gun leg-
islation.70 Some states, on the other hand, have been actively
working to rein in gun violence, passing various laws intended
to reduce such violence.71 And how have these laws fared in the
post-Heller world? In spite of more than 1,000 challenges to gun
laws on Second Amendment grounds during the ensuing years,
challengers have enjoyed relatively few victories. 72 In the years
following Heller, lower courts read Heller narrowly.73 In fact,
only nine percent of the challenges to firearm legislation heard
between 2008 and 2016 succeeded. 74
Still, legislatures' ability to pass constitutionally-permissi-
ble gun regulation remains cloaked in uncertainty. While in gen-
eral courts have read Heller narrowly, success rates vary de-
pending on, among other things, location. 75 Litigants
challenging gun laws "have succeeded most frequently-both in
68. These permissible limitations include laws forbidding felons and those
with mental illness from owning guns, laws forbidding guns in certain places
(including schools and government buildings), laws regulating the commercial
sales of guns, and laws banning certain types of guns that are not in common
use. Id.
69. Id. at 636.
70. Nicholas Fandos & Thomas Kaplan, Victims Vent Frustration as Law-
makers Show Inability to Act on Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, at A19.
71. See Michael Siegel et al., Firearm-Related Laws in All 50 US States,
1991-2016, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1122, 1125--26 (2017).
72. Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1143, 1179
(2015); Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical
Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433,
1435, 1498 (2018).
73. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below,
104 GEO. L.J. 921, 962 (2016).
74. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 72, at 1473. About eight percent of chal-
lenges to firearms laws succeeded at the federal trial court level, while thirteen
percent of federal appellate challenges succeeded. Id. At the state appellate
level, challengers similarly prevailed nine percent of the time. Id.
75. Id. at 1474-75.
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absolute terms and proportionally-in the Second, Fourth, Sev-
enth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits." 76
In fact, in two 2018 cases, the Ninth Circuit invalidated gun
laws as violative of the Second Amendment.7 7 In the first of those
cases, Duncan v. Becerra,78 the district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against a law banning firearm magazines that
held more than ten rounds of ammunition. 79 The law had been
enacted by ballot initiative, and not only banned the sale of such
magazines in the future, but criminalized their ownership, even
by individuals who had acquired them prior to the effective date
of the law.8 0
The court found that high-capacity magazines qualified as
"arms" within the definition of the Second Amendment.8 1 More-
over, the court found that they were the type of arms commonly
used to defend "self, home, and state." 8 2 As a result, it held that
under the Supreme Court's analysis in Heller, the absolute pro-
hibition on such magazines likely violated the Second Amend-
ment, and given the potential harms to gun owners, warranted
a preliminary injunction against the law.8 3 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit found that the district court had not abused its discretion
and upheld the preliminary injunction. 84
A week later, the Ninth Circuit issued its second gun-related
opinion. Young v. Hawaii85 dealt, for the first time, with the
question of "the degree to which the Second Amendment pro-
tects, or does not protect, the carrying of firearms outside of the
home." 86 Hawaiian law generally required gun owners to leave
their guns at their home or place of business unless they had an
76. Id. at 1475. In fact, these five circuits account for all but one of the suc-
cessful federal appellate challenges to firearms laws. Id.
77. See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh'g granted, 915
F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019); Duncan v. Becerra, 742 Fed. Appx. 218 (9th Cir. 2018).
78. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2017), affd, 742
Fed. Appx. 218.
79. Id. at 1139-40.
80. Id. at 1109-10.
81. Id. at 1139.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1114-15, 1139.
84. Duncan v. Becerra, 742 Fed. Appx. 218 (9th Cir. 2018).
85. 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh'g granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir.
2019).
86. Id. at 1051.
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open or concealed carry license. 87 Absent a license, gun owners
could only transport a firearm if it was unloaded and in a closed
container, and could only transport it between certain statuto-
rily-delineated locations.8 8
Mr. Young applied for a license twice, and had his applica-
tion denied both times. 89 He then challenged the regulatory
scheme, asserting that he had a Second Amendment right to
carry a loaded handgun in public. 90 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that because the Second Amendment provided an individual, ra-
ther than a collective, right to bear arms, the fact that Hawaii's
law "entirely foreclosed" individual citizens' ability to carrying a
loaded gun in public "violates the core of the Second Amendment
and is void."91
Even if other Circuits do not follow the Ninth Circuit's lead,
and continue to read Heller narrowly, the Supreme Court can
always step in to reassert the importance of the Second Amend-
ment. Justice Clarence Thomas has criticized lower courts for
failing to protect the Second Amendment and failing to comply
with the Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence, decrying
"the lower courts' general failure to afford the Second Amend-
ment the respect due an enumerated constitutional right."9 2 The
Supreme Court could, at any point, reverse lower courts' defer-
ence to legislatures on gun legislation.
And where does that leave legislatures that want to enact
laws to reduce gun violence? Under Heller, they can constitution-
ally enact laws aimed at reducing gun violence, including certain
regulation of handguns. 93 Such laws cannot, however, impose
"an absolute prohibition [on] handguns held and used for self-
defense in the home." 9 4 If this analysis is any indication, courts
87. Id. at 1048.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1049.
91. Id. at 1071.
92. Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct.
447, 448-49 (2015) (same); Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799,
2799 (2015) (same).
93. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
94. Id.
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are capable of being deeply skeptical of laws that limit an indi-
vidual's access to guns, even while acknowledging the danger
and tragedy of firearm violence.9 5
III. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AND TAXES
The post-Heller uncertainty surrounding the permissible
regulation of firearms makes legislation significantly more diffi-
cult. And where direct regulation is difficult, it makes sense to
try to address gun violence through alternative means. In deal-
ing with negative externalities, the main alternative to regula-
tion is a Pigouvian tax. 96 A Pigouvian tax is a small tax imposed
on an activity or product that creates a negative externality.9 7 If
determined correctly, the tax will equal the marginal social cost
of the activity or product, thus causing consumers to internalize
the full cost of the activity.98 A Pigouvian tax forces individuals
to "consider the extra social cost when they decide to undertake
[a] taxed activity."9 9 If it is designed correctly, then, a Pigouvian
tax can discourage the overconsumption of socially costly activi-
ties by raising individuals' costs, and can reimburse society for
the negative externalities imposed by the proper level of con-
sumption of such products and activities. 0 0
Perhaps the textbook example of a Pigouvian tax is a carbon
tax. 0 1 Because carbon-intensive goods and activities contribute
to climate change, their use imposes a cost on society which is
95. See Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1139 (S.D. Cal. 2017)
("Every injury or death caused by the misuse of a firearm is a tragedy. That the
mentally ill and violent criminals choose to misuse firearms is well known. This
latest incremental incursion into solving the 'gun violence' problem is a reflex-
ively simple solution. But as H.L. Mencken wrote, 'There is always a well-known
solution to every human problem-neat, plausible, and wrong."'), aff'd, 742 F.
App'x 218 (9th Cir. 2018).
96. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 1682 ("The particular appeal of Pigovian [sic]
taxes today can be traced back to our collective awareness of the pitfalls of com-
mand-and-control regulation.").
97. See id. at 1675.
98. Id.
99. LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVE-
RYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 98 (2013).
100. See Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing External-
ities Under State Law, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168, 195-96 (2018).
101. See Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMP.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
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not fully borne by those who consume the goods. 102 A carbon tax
increases the price of carbon-intensive goods and activities so
that consumers bear "their full social cost." 103
In theory, so-called "sin taxes" are also Pigouvian taxes. 104
The idea underlying sin taxes is that individuals' consumption
of certain things imposes a cost on society and this cost is not
fully internalized by the user. 105 Traditionally, states have im-
posed sin taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and gambling. 106 Secondhand
smoke, for instance, harms nonsmokers who thus bear part of
the cost of tobacco use.107 Likewise, alcohol consumption can lead
to societal costs which are not internalized by the consumer of
alcohol, including accidents from driving drunk. 108
Recently, in fact, a number of cities have expanded-or tried
to expand-the realm of sin taxes to sugary drinks. 109 The theory
behind taxes on sugary drinks is that they lead to obesity and by
raising the cost of such drinks the government can reduce the
rate of obesity.110 Regarding the negative externalities sugary
beverages impose, proponents of soda taxes argue that medical
costs related to obesity represent about nine percent of U.S.
healthcare costs, and that half of these costs are paid for by the
public through Medicare and Medicaid.1 1 1
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax: Politics, Morality, and
Fiscal Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565, 2567-68 (2016).
105. Id.
106. Andrew J. Haile, Sin Taxes: When the State Becomes the Sinner, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1042 (2009).
107. Carruthers, supra note 104, at 2567-68.
108. See Michael Grossman et al., Policy Watch: Alcohol and Cigarette Taxes,
7 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 212 (1993).
109. These taxes have been vehemently opposed by the soda industry, which
recently convinced the state of California to ban taxes on sugary drinks until
2031. Editorial, California's Ban on Soda Taxes Should Not Stand, BLOOM-
BERG, (July 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2018-07-23/california-soda-tax-ban-should-not-stand [https://perma.cc/4CNU
-8EY6].
110. Roland Sturm et al., Soda Taxes, Soft Drink Consumption, and Chil-
dren's Body Mass Index, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1052, 1052 (2010).
111. Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1601-02
(2009).
2019]1 621
MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW
It is tempting, both for advocates and opponents of stricter
gun regulation, to think of a Pigouvian tax on firearms as an-
other type of sin tax.112 If the principal goal underlying the fire-
arms tax were to reduce gun violence, however, this type of tax
would be far more difficult to design. There are two significant,
and related, objections to the idea of imposing a Pigouvian fire-
arms tax with the intention of modifying gun owners' behavior.
The first is that it is difficult to design a tax that will change
behavior. As Professor Fleischer points out,
If a carbon tax is the most promising application of Pigovian taxation,
a tax on guns is among the least. . .. In the aggregate, there is no ques-
tion that the social cost of guns far exceeds the private cost of manu-
facturing a gun. At the individual level, however, where incentives
matter most directly, people vary widely in how they use a gun. Some
people attend gun safety workshops, practice shooting at the range,
and keep guns secure. Others are more lackadaisical, increasing the
risk of accidental shootings. And of course, a small number of criminals
use guns to commit violent crimes. 113
A tax on guns could not reasonably differentiate between the
individual who keeps her guns unloaded and locked in a safe and
the individual who keeps her guns loaded under her bed, much
less encourage the second to behave in a safer manner. Both the
responsible and the irresponsible gun owners would pay the
same amount in taxes. As a result, a Pigouvian tax would pro-
vide no incentive for irresponsible gun owners-or even criminal
gun owners-to act more responsibly. 114
Relatedly, the vast majority of gun owners do not commit
violent crimes with their guns,11 5 and the vast majority of guns
112. For example, one opponent of stricter firearm regulation asserts that
excise taxes on firearms represent "indirect restrictions on gun ownership," and
investigates "the economic case for broad-based taxes on firearms as a method
for controlling the criminal misuse of firearms." Bruce H. Kobayashi, Gun Con-
trol, Strict Liability, and Excise Taxes, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POL-
ITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 309, 310 (William F. Shughart II ed., 1997).
113. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 1677.
114. In theory, a tax on guns could be designed in a manner that would pro-
vide incentives to behave more responsibly. Gun owners who kept their guns
secure and who attended gun safety workshops, could pay a lower rate of tax
than individuals who acted irresponsibly. As a practical matter, though, such a
tax regime would be unadministrable and deeply invasive. Unless the taxing
authority took gun owners' words that they acted responsibly, it would have to
somehow monitor how gun owners stored and treated their guns. Such monitor-
ing would both require significant resources and effort and would require the
government to have an intimate knowledge of citizens' private behaviors.
115. In fact, a study of Pittsburgh crime in 2008 showed that in almost
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are not used in crimes. 116 Opponents of such taxation argue that
the broad Pigouvian taxation of firearms "punishes those who do
not misuse them." 117
Both of these objections have played a part in the design of
my proposed tax regime. To the first, the proposal is not intended
to change individuals' behavior. Its goal is much more modest: to
cause gun owners to internalize the externalities gun ownership
imposes on society and, to the extent that gun violence still im-
poses costs, to reimburse society for those costs. 118
While it is true that most gun owners do not personally com-
mit acts of gun violence that impose costs on society, it is also
true that their gun ownership is correlated to the amount of gun
violence that occurs. 119 Compelling evidence demonstrates that
in the United States, "where there are more guns, there are more
violent deaths." 120 It is not clear whether the relationship is
causal, but at the very least there is a strong correlation. 121
Moreover, it is impossible to know in advance whether a partic-
ular gun will be used in a violent crime, a suicide, or will other-
eighty percent of crimes that involved firearms, the perpetrator was not the le-
gal owner of the gun. Anthony Fabio et al., Gaps Continue in Firearm Surveil-
lance: Evidence from a Large U.S. City Bureau of Police, 10 Soc. MED. 13, 19
(2016).
116. It is hard to determine precisely how many guns there are in the United
States. Estimates range from 270 million to 310 million. Drew DeSilver, A Mi-
nority of Americans Own Guns, but Just How Many Is Unclear, PEW RES. CTR.:
FAcTTANK (June 4, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/04/a
-minority-of-americans-own-guns-but-just-how-many-is-uncleari [https://
perma.cc/VV3Z-6BLJ]. In 2011, 467,321 individuals were the victims of crimes
committed with a firearm. Gun Violence, NAT'L INST. JUST. (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-violence/pages/welcome.aspx [https://
perma.cc/TC56-YD5W]. Even assuming that every victim was victimized by a
different gun, that means that less than 0.2 percent of guns were involved in
crimes.
117. Kobayashi, supra note 112, at 311.
118. Provided that gun ownership is economically elastic, the proposed gun
tax may affect behavior at the margins. Because the tax raises the cost of gun
ownership, gun owners are likely to reduce their consumption of guns to a so-
cially-optimal level. I discuss this behavioral change more infra Part V.D.
119. Matthew Miller et al., Firearms and Violent Death in the United States,
in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING POLICY WITH EVIDENCE
AND ANALYSIS 3, 13 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013).
120. Id. at 13.
121. Cf. id. at 12-13 (acknowledging causal inferences between suicide rates
and firearm availability).
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wise impose costs on society. As a result, rather than punish-
ment, a broad tax on guns merely recognizes that the gun own-
ership is correlated with higher externalities.
Even acknowledging the weaknesses of a Pigouvian tax on
firearms as a regulatory regime, there is a reason to impose such
a tax. Though it may be too blunt an instrument to effectively
channel behavior, a firearms tax can raise revenue to compen-
sate taxpayers for the negative externalities they would other-
wise bear.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON A PIGOUVIAN
GUN TAX
As I will explain in Part V, a Pigouvian firearms tax should
have two components. The first would be an excise tax on fire-
arms, bullets, and other gun accessories. The second would be an
annual tax on each firearm owned by an individual. Before get-
ting to the particular design of the taxes, though, we must look
at the constitutional regime within which the tax must function.
A tax on firearms implicates three potential constitutional bar-
riers and must be designed with those barriers in mind. First,
the tax must comply with the Second Amendment right to bear
arms; second, it must fit within the legislature's constitutional
taxing authority; and third, it cannot violate the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Con-
stitution. This Article will discuss the scope and relevance of
each of these constitutional limitations below.
A. RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs
While taxes can influence an individual's behavior, taxes are
different from regulation and legislatures face different consti-
tutional constraints in imposing taxes than they do in regulating
behavior. 122 Where the legislature chooses to directly regulate
behavior through law, a legislature can require individuals to
take or avoid particular actions and can impose a variety of pun-
ishments if an individual does not take or avoid the regulated
action. 123 By contrast, when a legislature imposes a tax on a par-
ticular action, individuals can decide whether they will pay the
122. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 572-74 (2012)
(upholding components of the Affordable Care Act, such as the individual man-
date to purchase insurance or incur a penalty as a "tax").
123. Id. at 573.
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tax or face punishment if they decline. 124 "But imposition of a tax
nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do or not
do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on
that choice." 125
Of course, if the courts always ignored the economic incen-
tives of taxation, the government could circumvent individual
rights by imposing prohibitive taxes on the exercise of those
rights. In that vein, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Min-
nesota Commissioner of Revenue, the Supreme Court held that a
Minnesota tax on the use of ink and paper violated the First
Amendment's guarantee of press freedom. 12 6
Although Minnesota law exempted the retail sale of period-
icals from its sales tax, in 1971 it "impose[d] a 'use tax' on the
cost of paper and ink products consumed in the production of a
publication."1 2 7 Three years later, the legislature exempted the
first $100,000 of paper and ink used annually by a publication. 128
This tax on paper and ink was the only tax imposed on goods in
the chain of commerce before they were sold at retail, 129 and the
$100,000 exemption meant that only fourteen and sixteen of the
state's 388 newspapers paid the tax in 1974 and 1975, respec-
tively. 130 Moreover, a single publication-the Star Tribune-
paid about two-thirds of the tax collected.131
The Court was skeptical of the tax; not only was it unusual
for a use tax, 132 but it singled out the press. 133 Because the press
functions as a constraint on governmental overreach, a tax fo-
cusing exclusively on the press "gives a government a powerful
weapon against" the press. 134 For the Court to uphold the tax
124. Id. at 574.
125. Id.
126. 460 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1983).
127. Id. at 577.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 578-79.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 581 ("Minnesota's treatment of publications differs from that
of other enterprises in at least two important respects: it imposes a use tax that
does not serve the function of protecting the sales tax, and it taxes an interme-
diate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale.").
133. Id. at 583. A tax of general applicability that fell on newspapers and
other businesses would not have sustained a First Amendment challenge. See
id. at 585.
134. Id. at 585.
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regime, Minnesota had to demonstrate a compelling interest in
applying a differential tax. 135 The need to raise revenue was
found to be insufficient, given that the state could have raised
revenue equally well with a generally-applicable tax. 136 Addi-
tionally, not only was the tax aimed solely at the press, but it
only applied to a handful of newspapers. 137 Whatever the Min-
nesota legislature's goal with the tax, the Court saw its effect as
penalizing the state's largest papers. 13 8 As a result, the Court
struck the tax down as an unconstitutional infringement of the
freedom of the press.139
The Court's decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune is not
directly applicable to a tax on guns, of course. The Court's con-
cerns about the press's role in preventing government overreach
do not directly apply to gun ownership. The core of the right to
bear arms, according to the Court, is self-defense, not the limita-
tion on government that a free press helps ensure. 140 Still, the
case underscores that, imposed recklessly, a tax can violate an
individual's constitutional rights. 14 1
While the modern Court generally "decline[s] to closely ex-
amine the regulatory motive or effect of revenue-raising
measures," 142 there is a point at which the nature of a tax shifts
to "become[] a mere penalty with the characteristics of regula-
tion and punishment."1 43
The Court has not laid out where the line between tax and
regulation falls. 144 However, it is relatively clear that if the tax
is so prohibitively burdensome that it makes gun ownership eco-
nomically infeasible, it would cross that line. To design a tax on
135. Id.
136. Id. at 586.
137. Id. at 591.
138. Id. at 591-92.
139. Id. at 593.
140. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
141. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 593.
142. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 573 (2012).
143. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
144. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 573 ("Because the tax
at hand is within even those strict limits, we need not here decide the precise
point at which an exaction becomes so punitive that the taxing power does not
authorize it."). The Court does recognize, though, that every tax has some regu-
latory effect; the simple existence of such effect does not automatically disqual-
ify it from being treated as a tax. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513
(1937).
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guns that would not violate the Second Amendment, it would
need to be reasonable. Moreover, although the policy underlying
the Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. decision is easily distin-
guishable from the policy underlying the individual right to bear
arms, an articulate legislature would bolster its case for the con-
stitutionality of its firearms tax by stating why the tax applied
solely to guns, rather than to personal property generally.
B. DIRECT TAXES
The Constitution prohibits the federal government from lev-
ying any "capitation, or other direct, Tax ... unless in Propor-
tion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken." 14 5 To the extent the federal government wants to impose
a direct tax, then, that tax must be apportioned to states on the
basis of their population. 146
While the rule is simple enough, the definition of "direct tax"
has historically been extremely ambiguous. 147 During the first
century of the Constitution, the Supreme Court took a narrow
view of direct taxes, holding that the definition of "direct taxes"
encompassed only poll taxes and taxes on land.148 At the end of
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded the defini-
tion to also include taxes on personal property and income from
personal property. 149 While the passage of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment gave the federal government authority to tax income with-
out apportioning the tax, 150 the Supreme Court "continued to
consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes."1 51
This interpretation of direct tax poses a significant impedi-
ment to a federal tax on firearms. Because firearms are personal
property, a property tax on firearms would be a tax on personal
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; see also id. § 2, cl. 3.
146. Nat'? Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 570 ("[Any 'direct Tax' must be
apportioned so that each State pays in proportion to its population.").
147. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes" Are Consumption
Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2336 (1997).
148. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 571.
149. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) ("We are
of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal prop-
erty, are likewise direct taxes.").
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
151. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 571; see also Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U.S. 189, 218-19 (1920).
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property. 152 As long as firearms are not spread across the states
proportionate to state populations, apportioning the tax would,
in the words of Justice Chase, "evidently create great inequality
and injustice."15 3
How would apportioning the firearms tax result in inequity
and injustice? A simplified example illustrates how. Imagine
that the United States is made up of only two states, Wyoming
and New York. In the 2010 census, New York had a population
of 19,378,102.154 Wyoming's population was 563,626.155 Accord-
ing to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF), in 2017, there were 76,207 registered firearms in New
York and 132,806 in Wyoming. 156
This stylized United States has just under 20 million resi-
dents. Of those, about 97 percent live in New York, and three
percent live in Wyoming. If the federal government wanted to
raise $1 million from the gun tax, New York taxpayers would be
responsible for $970,000 of the apportioned direct tax, and Wyo-
ming would be responsible for $30,000. But in spite of Wyoming's
population being a fraction of New York's, Wyoming has almost
152. An excise tax, on the other hand, would not be a direct tax. See Jensen,
supra note 147, at 2405 ("As long as a value-added tax (or other form of national
sales tax) is uniform in its application, it should survive constitutional scru-
tiny."). Although the federal government considered imposing its own sales tax
on a number of occasions, it never did. See Lawrence A. Zelenak, The Federal
Retail Sales Tax That Wasn't: An Actual History and an Alternate History, 73
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149 (2010). The fact that the federal government
has never imposed a sales tax does not, however, suggest that it faces a consti-
tutional obstacle in doing so.
153. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796).
154. QuickFacts New York; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/NY,US[POP010210 [https://perma.cc/
2YZM-WNC6].
155. QuickFacts Wyoming; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/WY,US/POP010210 [https://perma.cc/
K6QN-BYE2].
156. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST., BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & Ex-
PLOSIVES, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES ANNUAL STATISTICAL
UPDATE 2017, at 15 (2017), https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/
undefined/firearms-commerce-united-states-annual-statistical-update-2017/
download [https://perma.cc/4TJX-K583] [hereinafter ATF, STATISTICAL UP-
DATE]. The number of registered firearms undoubtedly understates the actual
number of firearms in the states, but it will work for purposes of this hypothet-
ical. In imposing the actual firearms tax, of course, a government would have to
know how many firearms exist in its jurisdiction. I discuss how it might do so
infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
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twice as many guns as New York. As a result, in Wyoming, gun
owners would pay a tax of about $0.23 per gun.15 7 New York gun
owners, on the other hand, would have to pay $12.73 per gun, or
more than fifty-five times as much as Wyoming gun owners
would have to per gun.158
Because states vary dramatically in the number of guns per
person, the rate of tax per gun would necessarily vary by state.
In spite of the injustice, under contemporary direct tax jurispru-
dence, the tax would, nonetheless, need to be apportioned.
This apportionment rule only applies to the federal govern-
ment, however. The Constitution does nothing to impede states'
ability to levy direct taxes.15 9 Even if a federal firearms tax were
preferable on policy grounds to state taxes, as long as the Su-
preme Court considers taxes on personal property to be direct
taxes, a federal gun tax would be fundamentally unfair, treating
similarly-situated individuals radically differently.16 0 States,
however, face no such constitutional constraint. States can im-
pose Pigouvian gun taxes with no constitutional infirmity.
In fact, state-level Pigouvian firearms taxes may be better
as a practical matter than federal taxes. Among other things, the
immediate costs of first responders and medical care are borne
at the local level, and state and local governments are closer to
the people who are hurt. Moreover, as Justice Brandeis ex-
plained in a dissent, it "is one of the happy incidents of the fed-
eral system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 161
157. That is, the $30,000 tax allocated to Wyoming divided by the 132,806
guns in the state.
158. New York would have to divide the $970,000 tax allocated to the state
by the 76,207 guns in the state.
159. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 620 (1895) (explaining
that the states "retained the power of direct taxation").
160. Cf. Barry Sullivan, Three Tiers, Exceedingly Persuasive Justifications
and Undue Burdens: Searching for the Golden Mean in U.S. Constitutional Law,
20 EuR. J.L. REFORM 181, 188 (2018) ("The central meaning of equal protec-
tion-that like cases should be treated alike, and those that are different should
be treated differently-is both a characteristic and an aspiration of the rule of
law.").
161. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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Some state legislatures can decide that they do not believe
that gun ownership produces negative externalities and not im-
pose a firearms tax at all. Other states can design a firearms tax
in different ways, using different bases and rates for the tax. And
because these taxes would be imposed (or not) at the state level,
policymakers could evaluate the different results from different
tax regimes and determine what best achieves the goal of reduc-
ing the negative externalities borne by the state and its taxpay-
ers.
C. TAKINGS
In Duncan, the district court did not enjoin the prohibition
on high-capacity magazines solely on Second Amendment
grounds. 162 The court was also particularly concerned that the
law represented an uncompensated governmental taking, in vi-
olation of the Fifth Amendment. 163 Had it gone into effect, Cali-
fornia's law would have done more than prospectively prevent
residents from acquiring high-capacity magazines. It would have
criminalized the possession of high-capacity magazines owned
before the law went into effect.164
The law provided residents of California who already owned
high-capacity magazines three avenues to avoid criminal liabil-
ity. They could (1) remove the magazine from the state, (2) sell
it to a licensed firearms dealer, or (3) surrender it to a law-en-
forcement agency for destruction.16 5 The court believed that the
options to sell magazines or remove them from the state were
more illusory than real options. 166 Because that just left the op-
162. Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2017). In Duncan,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's preliminary injunction against a
firearm magazine band. Duncan v. Becerra, 742 Fed. Appx. 218, 221 (9th Cir.
2018). See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
163. Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 ("The public interest also favors the
protection of an individual's core Second Amendment rights and his or her pro-
tection from an uncompensated governmental taking that goes too far.").
164. Id. at 1110. The federal district court in Maryland disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit, holding that a possession ban was not a per se taking. Md. Shall
Issue v. Hogan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 400, 416 (D. Md. 2018).
165. Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1110.
166. With high-capacity magazines banned in California, the court said that
prices were likely to fall to nearly zero as the date the law took effect approached
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tion of giving up ownership and physical possession, the law rep-
resented a taking that constitutionally required just compensa-
tion. 16 7
Like the California law, an annual tax on firearms would
apply both to firearms acquired before and after the law went
into effect. But from a legal perspective, the two laws would be
entirely different. Most importantly, complying with the tax law
would not require gun owners to give up ownership and posses-
sion of their firearms. The tax would not force the taking of a
gun.
The Supreme Court has been clear that taxation is not a
taking under the Fifth Amendment.168 Governments can impose
taxes on property even though taxes necessarily impose financial
burdens on property owners. 169 An annual tax on guns-even if
the guns were owned before the tax was enacted-is not a taking
requiring just compensation. 170
and removing magazines to another state both required that another state ac-
cept them, and was potentially more expensive than the fair market value of
the magazine. Neither, then, represented a realistic option. Id. at 1138.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Mobile Cty. v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 703 (1880) ("But neither
is taxation for a public purpose, however great, the taking of private property
for public use, in the sense of the Constitution.").
169. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 615 (2013)
("This case therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose prop-
erty taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose finan-
cial burdens on property owners."). In fact, in some cases, the government can
take money through taxes that it could not have taken directly. For instance,
the Court has held that "a State Supreme Court's seizure of the interest on cli-
ent funds held in escrow was a taking despite the unquestionable constitutional
propriety of a tax that would have raised exactly the same revenue." Id. at 616.
170. Taxing guns that were owned before the tax was enacted is different
from applying the tax retroactively (that is, imposing the tax for years before
the tax was passed). Retroactivity is constitutionally permissible under certain
circumstances. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) ("This Court
repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax legislation against a due process chal-
lenge."). The precise contours of acceptable retroactive tax legislation are uncer-
tain, though. Robert R. Gunning, Back from the Dead: The Resurgence of Due
Process Challenges to Retroactive Tax Legislation, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 292
(2009) ("The [Carlton] majority opinion declined to articulate a bright-line
standard or set forth concrete, objective criteria to use in evaluating due process
challenges to retroactive tax measures."). There is no reason that the gun tax
needs to be applied retroactively, though, so searching for the line separating
permissible from impermissible retroactivity is beyond the scope of this article.
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Even if the tax is not a taking, though, would it violate the
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution? Article I of the Con-
stitution prohibits both the federal government and state gov-
ernments from passing any "ex post facto Law." 171 Would a prop-
erty tax on guns constitute an ex post facto law? After all, even
if the legislature did not make the tax retroactive, it would apply
to guns that individuals had acquired prior to the enactment of
the tax.
In general, the Ex Post Facto Clauses "forbid[] the applica-
tion of any new punitive measure to a crime already consum-
mated." 1 7 2 The Constitution prohibits legislatures from retroac-
tively changing the definition of a crime or increasing its
punishment. 173 Historically, though, the Supreme Court held
that it was "settled that this prohibition is confined to laws re-
specting criminal punishments, and has no relation to retrospec-
tive legislation of any other description." 1 74
Because a firearms tax is a civil, not criminal, law, the Ex
Post Facto Clauses would presumptively do nothing to prevent
legislatures from enacting it, even if it were retroactive. The
Court recognizes, though, that just because a legislature calls a
law civil does not mean that it is, in fact, civil. Still, the Court
generally defers to the legislature's intent, 175 deeming a civil law
criminal only where it is "so punitive either in purpose or effect
as to negate" the legislature's intent that it be treated as civil. 17 6
In evaluating the question of whether a putatively civil law
is punitive enough to invoke the Ex Post Facto Clauses, courts
look at several factors including whether a regulatory scheme
has historically been treated as punishment, whether it affirm-
atively restrains conduct, whether it has a "rational connection
to a nonpunitive purpose," and whether it is excessive. 177 More-
171. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 9, cl. 3; see also id. § 10, cl. 1.
172. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937).
173. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 38 (1990).
174. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912).
175. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (holding that in deter-
mining whether a statute is civil, the Court "ordinarily defer[s] to the legisla-
ture's stated intent').
176. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
177. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). These four criteria (as well as
three others) are neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but are useful guides in
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over, the burden is on the individual challenging the law to pro-
vide "clearest proof" that the law is so punitive as to be effectively
a criminal statute.178
Taxes are not punitive.179 And even penalties for the non-
payment of taxes, which are clearly punitive, are generally not
treated as the effective equivalent of criminal sanction. 180 As
long as the penalties are designed to prevent loss of revenue, to
reimburse the government for the costs of investigation, and are
not disproportionate, penalties for nonpayment of tax do not vi-
olate the Ex Post Facto Clauses. 181
Ultimately, then, a Pigouvian tax on firearms, like any other
tax, will not be a taking that requires just compensation. More-
over, as long as the tax is not punitive-which it should not be-
it will not be an unconstitutional ex post facto law. In fact, even
if it were retroactive-which it also should not be-it would not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses unless someone challenging
the law provided clear and compelling proof that the law was
meant to be as punitive as a criminal statute.
V. DESIGNING THE TAX
Designed properly, a Pigouvian tax on firearms can be an
effective way to deal with the negative externalities gun owner-
ship imposes on society. 182 An effective firearms tax should be
determining whether a statute labeled "civil" by a legislature is, in fact, crimi-
nal. Id.
178. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (citing Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
179. Bankers' Tr. Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647, 651 (1923) ("The payment of
taxes is an obvious and insistent duty.").
180. See id.
181. See Karpa v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d 784, 787 (4th Cir. 1990).
182. Tax is, of course, not the only way to deal with the externalities. Tort
liability and insurance also can require gun owners to internalize the social
costs they impose by virtue of their gun ownership. Cf. Jennifer B. Wriggins,
Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies: Driving, Insurance, Torts, and
Changing the "Choice Architecture" of Auto Insurance Pricing, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 69, 72-73 (2010) ("Driving has many negative externalities, including
greenhouse gas emissions, risks of causing or suffering physical injury, highway
costs, and negative public health consequences that were not considered when
the current tort-and-insurance framework was built."). Both tort and insurance
have their problems, though. Individual shooters may well be judgment-proof,
or at least have insufficient assets to compensate victims for their injuries and,
while firearm manufacturers may have more assets, Congress has deliberately
shielded them from most tort liability for the criminal use of firearms. Stephen
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imposed at the state or local level, both for political reasons 18 3
and so that it does not have to be allocated to the states according
to their populations. 184 Moreover, a tax may be easier to design
in a way that does not risk violating the Constitution than other
types of gun regulation, making it more politically palatable.
What should such a tax look like? I recommend two parts to
the tax: an excise tax on firearms and ammunition, and an an-
nual property tax on firearms.1 85 The first two Sections will dis-
cuss the excise tax and the property tax, respectively. Section C
will proceed to discuss how states should use the revenue raised
from the firearms taxes. It will explain that after a state col-
lected the revenue raised by the firearms taxes, it would ear-
mark the revenue from the taxes to a fund used exclusively to
pay for the costs of gun violence. While the tax itself would not
be excessive, nonpayment would subject a gun owner to signifi-
cant civil and, in some cases, criminal penalties. Finally, Section
D. Sugarman, Torts and Guns, 10 J. TORT L. 3, 5 (2017) ("PLCAA is primarily
intended to protect gun makers and gun sellers from liability in situations in
which the gun is then criminally used."). And an insurance mandate has two
potential problems. The first is, if social cost is imposed by an individual without
insurance, society bears the full cost of the externalities. Second, insurers must
be willing to insure gun owners. While insurance companies are private actors
and not subject to the Second Amendment, if they were unwilling to insure gun
owners or only willing to do so at exorbitant prices, requiring gun owners to
carry insurance could be the economic equivalent of banning guns, and thus
violate the Second Amendment.
183. The federal government has been singularly unable to enact firearms
legislation. The last major federal restrictions on firearms enacted by Congress
was the 1993 Brady Bill, which required background checks on buyers when
they bought from retail sellers. Mary D. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Pre-
venting Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 90 IND. L.J. 151, 160-61 (2015).
184. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. While a state-level tax
makes the most sense, not every state can currently enact a firearms tax. Forty-
four states have state constitutional provisions that enshrine a right-separate
from the federal right-to bear arms. Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional
Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 192 (2006). Most of
these provisions "are written quite differently from the Second Amendment."
Id. While I suspect that few of these state constitutions would prohibit the tax-
ation of firearms, analyzing each one is beyond the scope of this Article. Without
such analysis, it is still clear that not every state could enact the firearms tax I
propose. For example, the Idaho state constitution prohibits, among other
things, "special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or ammu-
nition." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.
185. The sales tax could also apply to other firearm accessories, especially
those like bump stocks and high-capacity magazines, that increase the likeli-
hood of negative externalities.
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D will discuss certain effects that the firearms taxes could have
on gun owners' behavior.
A. EXCISE TAX
An excise tax is "a consumption tax on a particular item." 186
An excise tax on firearms and ammunition is an important ini-
tial step in the firearms tax regime. Part of the inefficiency in
the gun market is that, because society bears some of the cost of
gun ownership while gun owners fully internalize the benefits,
gun purchasers pay too little for their guns. As a result, they ac-
quire more guns than they would if they bore the full cost of gun
ownership.
An excise tax should help correct that market failure, lead-
ing to the more efficient consumption of firearms and ammuni-
tion.187 More importantly, though, whether or not the excise tax
would correct market failures, it would begin to reimburse the
costs of gun violence not borne by gun owners.
An excise tax is relatively easy to design; in fact, models of
what it can look like already exist. There is already a federal
excise tax on guns, for example. Manufacturers, producers, and
importers of firearms must pay a ten-percent tax on pistols and
revolvers, and an eleven-percent tax on other firearms, shells,
and cartridges. 188 In 2017, the federal firearms excise tax raised
$761.6 million in revenue. 189
It is unlikely, however, that the federal excise tax has sub-
stantively reduced gun violence. It does raise the cost of acquir-
ing guns, but because it does not apply to private gun sales, pri-
vate gun owners can often sell guns for less than retail sellers. 190
186. BURMAN & SLEMROD, supra note 99, at 96.
187. Cf. Michael L. Marlow & Alden F. Shiers, Would Soda Taxes Really
Yield Health Benefits?, 33 REG. 34, 36 (2010). Note that Marlow and Shiers are
skeptical that a Pigouvian tax on sugary drinks would correct the market failure
that leads to obesity, because it is not clear either that sugary drinks lead to
obesity or that policymakers have the technical knowledge and skills necessary
to set the correct level of tax. Id. at 38.
188. I.R.C. § 4181 (2012).
189. Wesley Elmore, Proposed Increase in Gun Taxes Seen as Limited in Ef-
fectiveness, 158 TAXNOTES 1697, 1698 (2018).
190. Robert McClelland, New Gun and Ammo Taxes Sound Like Promising
Ways to Reduce Gun Violence. But There Are Problems., TAX POL. CTR.: TAXVOx
(May 24, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/new-gun-and-ammo
-taxes-sound-promising-ways-reduce-gun-violence-there-are-problems
[https://perma.cc/6ZTT-RF3Q].
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Moreover, in some states, private sales are not subject to back-
ground checks, 191 which may perversely increase the risk of fire-
arms being used to impose societal costs.
Not only does the federal excise tax do little to prevent gun
violence, it does almost nothing to reimburse society for the neg-
ative externalities it faces from gun ownership. Rather, revenues
from the federal excise tax are deposited in the Wildlife Restora-
tion Trust Fund and used to support wildlife restoration and
hunter education.192 In essence, the current federal firearms ex-
cise tax functions to "support the activities of those taxed" rather
than "curtail use of" firearms. 193 The federal excise tax has no
relationship at all to the negative externalities imposed by gun
violence.
Moreover, Congress seems as immobile with respect to its
excise tax on firearms as it is with respect to any other federal
gun legislation. In February 2018, Representative Danny K. Da-
vis introduced the Gun Violence Prevention and Safe Communi-
ties Act of 2018.194 The Act would raise the excise tax on firearms
to twenty percent, and the tax on ammunition to fifty percent.195
Revenue raised by the Act would be allocated to various organi-
zations that work to study and prevent gun violence. 196 The en-
actment of the Act would transform the federal firearms excise
tax into something closer to the kind of Pigouvian tax I recom-
mend in this Article.
The Act is unlikely to pass, though. Over the last several
Congressional sessions, a number of bills intended to increase
the excise tax on firearms and ammunition have been pro-
posed. 197 Not only have none of the bills passed, but none saw
any action after being introduced.198 While Congress's failure to
act until now is no guarantee that it cannot enact an excise tax
in the future, it seems unlikely that Congress will.
191. Id.
192. R. ELIOT CRAFrON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GUNS, EXCISE
TAXES, WILDLIFE RESTORATION, AND THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT 1-2 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misclR45123.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB83-CUJU].
193. Id. at 2.
194. H.R. 5103, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018).
195. Id. § 2(a).
196. Id. § 2(c)(1).
197. CRAFTON ET AL., supra note 192, at 12-13.
198. Id. at 13.
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States have proven to be more willing than the federal gov-
ernment to enact legislation regulating firearms. Over the first
half of 2018, twenty-six states enacted fifty-five gun safety
bills.199 In August 2018, the California legislature passed three
additional bills. 200 Moreover, some state and local governments
have enacted firearms taxes, and these examples may also be
instructive. For example, in 2015, the city of Seattle enacted an
excise tax on firearms on top of the federal excise tax. 201 Under
the Seattle Firearms and Ammunition Tax, retail sellers had to
pay a tax of $25 on each firearm sold in the city, $0.02 on each
round of .22 caliber (or less) ammunition, and $0.05 on each
round of other ammunition sold in the city.202
Unlike the federal excise tax, which supported the activities
of gun owners, Seattle intended to use the tax to "raise general
revenue for the City and to use that revenue to provide broad-
based public benefits for residents of Seattle related to gun vio-
lence by funding programs that promote public safety, prevent
gun violence and address in part the cost of gun violence in the
City." 203
Looking at both the federal excise tax and Seattle's firearms
tax reveals three principal design questions a legislature must
address in crafting an excise tax on firearms and ammunition.
The first is the tax base,204 the second is the rate, and the third
is who technically pays the tax.
While a legislature can decide precisely what it wants the
tax to cover, the Seattle tax provides a good model. It imposes its
199. Allison Anderman, Gun Law Trendwatch: 2018 Mid-Year Review,
GIFFORDS L. CTR. 3 (July 21, 2018), http://1awcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/Mid-year-Trendwatch-2018%E2%80%94FINAL-7.19.18
-pages.pdf [https://perma.ccYR87-SMNQ].
200. Amanda Michelle Gomez, California Passes Trio of Gun Control Bills,
Including Lifetime Ban on Domestic Violence Convicts, THINKPROGRESS (Aug.
28, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/california-passes-trio-of-gun-control-bills
-including-lifetime-ban-on-domestic-violence-convicts-cffcef596dc7/
[https://perma.cc/RW37-VV7Q].
201. Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Wash. 2017).
202. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNI. CODE § 5.50.030.B (2015).
203. SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL B. 118437 (Aug. 3, 2015).
204. The "tax base" means those things that the tax in question taxes. See,
e.g., Robert H. Gleason, Comment, Reevaluating the California Sales Tax: Ex-
emptions, Equity, Effectiveness, and the Need for a Broader Base, 33 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1681, 1690 n.30 (1996).
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excise tax on "firearms" and "ammunition."205 It defines firearm
as "a weapon from which a projectile or projectiles may be fired
by an explosive such as gunpowder." 206 It defines ammunition as
"any projectiles with their fuses, propelling charges, or primers
designed to be fired from firearms." 207 Seattle thus has chosen a
fairly comprehensive tax base. The tax base is administratively
simple, though: it does not try to differentiate between different
types of firearms. Moreover, while it differentiates between
types of ammunition, the dividing line is objectively measurable.
A .22 caliber bullet or smaller is taxed at one rate, while larger
ammunition is taxed at a slightly higher rate. 208
Once a legislature has chosen the tax base, it must choose
the rate of tax. Seattle chose a flat rate, irrespective of the cost
of the firearm or the ammunition. The $25 per firearm would be
the same, whether the retail sale was of a $120 rifle209 or a
$10,250 rifle. 210 Alternatively, the rate could be some percentage
of the retail price of the firearms and ammunition. A ten-percent
tax would yield a $12 tax on the first rifle, and a $102.50 tax on
the second.
Either choice is defensible. On the one hand, an individual
who pays more for a gun can also afford to pay more in taxes. A
flat per-firearm rate means that purchasers who buy cheaper
guns face an excise tax that makes up a much larger portion of
the gun's ultimate cost. On the other hand, there is no evidence
that expensive guns create more externalities than cheaper
guns. 21 1
205. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNI. CODE § 5.50.030.A.
206. Id. § 5.50.020.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 5.50.030.B.
209. Dick's Sporting Goods sells a Mossberg Plinkster Rifle for $119.99.
DICK's SPORTING GOODS, https://www.dickssportinggoods.com/p/mossberg
-plinkster-rifle-muzzle-break-16mosasmt221rrfllrif/16mosasmt221rrfllrif
[https://perma.cclQZ2K-SJQF].
210. Cabela's sells a Barrett 82A1 Centerfire Rifle for $10,249.99. CABELA'S,
https://www.cabelas.com/product/shooting/firearms/centerfire-rifles/
semiautomatic-centerfire-rifles/pc/104792580/c/5538295 8 0/s/10 5 5 2 2 4 8 0/il
105524280/barrett-a-cf-rifles/2468452.uts?slotId=O
[https://perma.cc/UZ4Q-HAPM].
211. Some survey data indicates that felons carry mid-priced guns, rather
than cheap guns. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSID-
ERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 170 (1986).
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Ultimately, under my proposed firearms tax regime, deter-
mining precise rate of the excise tax is unnecessary. As I will
discuss in the next section, the excise tax portion of the firearms
tax makes up a small portion of the ultimate tax; the property
tax portion will do the bulk of the work when it comes to paying
for externalities. 2 12 Because the excise tax would be imposed on
retail sales, though, it makes sense for it to be calculated as a
portion of the sales price. My proposed excise tax is broadly
structured like a targeted retail sales tax.2 13 Sales taxes are cal-
culated by adding a percentage of the retail price to a purchaser's
ultimate price and remitting that additional amount to the tax-
ing authority.2 14
The legislature enacting the gun excise tax would have to
determine the rate of the tax. The legislature does not have to
calibrate the rate to precisely capture the externalities imposed
by gun violence, both because the purpose of the tax is not pri-
marily to change behavior and because the excise tax is only one
part of the tax. Moreover, the excise tax cannot be so high that
it effectively prevents individuals from buying firearms they
have a constitutional right to acquire. But, while the precise
number is unimportant, a ten-percent excise tax on the purchase
of firearms and ammunition makes sense: it would raise revenue
without being unduly burdensome.
Finally, a legislature would have to determine whether the
tax was imposed on the seller or the purchaser. As a practical
matter, the difference here is mostly unimportant. Retail sales
taxes are imposed on the purchaser of goods but are collected
and remitted by the seller. 215 The principal difference would be
the salience of the tax: if it were imposed on the seller the fire-
arm's price would reflect the cost both of the firearm and the tax.
If it were imposed on the purchaser, the seller would not have to
include the excise tax in the sticker price. The amount of tax
would be less salient to gun purchasers and would do less to
counteract market failures.
212. See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
213. See BURMAN & SLEMROD, supra note 99, at 96.
214. Id. at 93. Note that the excise tax would be imposed in addition to the
ordinary retail sales tax.
215. William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, The Sales Tax and Electronic
Commerce: So What's New?, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 573, 576 (1997).
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There is one important difference, though: if the tax is im-
posed on sellers, an individual who purchases a firearm or am-
munition outside of the taxing jurisdiction has no tax liability. If
the tax is imposed on purchasers, it is possible to require gun
owners who reside in the taxing jurisdiction, and those who
bring their firearms into the jurisdiction, to pay the excise tax
irrespective of where they live. 2 1 6
B. PROPERTY TAx
Relying solely on an excise tax to deal with externalities cre-
ates two major problems. The first is that it encourages potential
gun purchasers to adjust their purchase to avoid the tax. They
can do that, for example, by accelerating their purchases. The
Seattle Firearms and Ammunition Tax was enacted in August
2015 but did not apply until January 1, 2016.217 That gave gun
buyers four months in which. they knew the additional tax was
coming, but they did not have to pay it. If an individual knew
that she was likely to buy a gun in the foreseeable future, she
had an incentive to accelerate that purchase, allowing her to buy
the gun without bearing the excise tax, and depriving the gov-
ernment of revenue to offset the social costs gun violence in-
flicts. 2 18
Alternatively, because the firearm excise tax would be a lo-
cal or a state tax, a gun purchaser could buy her firearm in a
jurisdiction without a firearm excise tax. The excise tax could be
designed with a concurrent use tax-style requirement, under
which she would owe the difference between the tax (if any) that
she paid in the other jurisdiction and the tax she owed in her
home jurisdiction. 2 1 9 If she really wanted to avoid the tax, she
216. See infra note 219.
217. Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Wash. 2017).
218. In fact, although Seattle estimated that the tax would raise $300,000 to
$500,000 in its first year, it ended up raising only about $200,000. Lynsi Burton,
Supreme Court Upholds Seattle Gun Tax, SEATTLEPI (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/Supreme-Court-upholds-Seattle
-gun-tax-11747876.php [https://perma.cc/EZG2-BF3R]. Even if the tax went
into effect on the day that it was enacted, individuals would have a similar abil-
ity to accelerate their purchases. Such a tax could not be enacted without some
discussion and debate, alerting potential purchasers that there was at least a
risk of the tax being imposed.
219. Most states with sales taxes also have use taxes. If a purchaser avoids
her home sales tax by buying a product in another state, she must remit the use
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could even build her own gun, whether from readily-available
parts or using a 3-D printer. 220
And that relates to the second problem: an excise tax on fire-
arms and ammunition is likely insufficient to pay for the exter-
nalities of gun violence. In the first instance, it is a purely pro-
spective tax. Although guns acquired before the enactment of the
tax also impose negative externalities, an excise tax alone would
not cause those gun owners to internalize any of the cost. There
are a lot of old guns still being used. Guns are remarkably dura-
ble, often lasting for decades. 221 If a legislature solely enacted an
excise tax it would force new purchasers to bear the externalities
caused by generations of firearms.
The cost of those generations of guns would be heavy. While
it is impossible to know precisely how many guns are sold in any
given year in the United States, in 2017, the FBI's National In-
stant Criminal Background Check System processed more than
25 million background checks. 222 Assuming that number accu-
rately represents the number of guns sold in the United States,
and using the lowest estimate of the public costs of gun vio-
lence-$45.6 billion 223-State governments would have to collect
an average of more than $1,800 per gun sold to pay for gun vio-
lence. At $500-a not-uncommon price for a 9-millimeter hand-
gun22 4-that would be a tax of 360 percent. That level of taxation
would be so prohibitively high that the tax would probably fail
to withstand Second Amendment scrutiny.
tax "as long as the good is consumed in the consumer's state of residence." BUR-
MAN & SLEMROD, supra note 99, at 94. The consumer, not the retailer, is respon-
sible for paying the use tax, though, and compliance is "virtually nonexistent."
Adam B. Thimmesch, Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: The Use-Tax Ex-
periment, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1083, 1086.
220. Jon Stokes, The Boring Truth About 3-D Printed Guns, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-stokes-3d-guns
-20180808-story.html [https://perma.cc/NZV8-Q8TP].
221. D. KIRK DAVIDSON, SELLING SIN: THE MARKETING OF SOCIALLY UNAC-
CEPTABLE PRODUCTS 57 (2003) ("Guns are unusually sturdy mechanical prod-
ucts; they seldom wear out from use and typically last for decades.").
222. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND
CHECK SYSTEM (NCIS) OPERATIONS, 2017, at ii (2017), https://www.fbi.gov/file
-repository/2017-nics-operations-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGWT-LXFP].
223. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
224. See Jay Willis, Owning a Gun in America Is a Luxury, GQ (Apr. 30,
2018), https://www.gq.com/story/gun-ownership-cost [https://perma.cc/8JYS
-3N5Z].
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To better approximate the actual cost of gun violence, as
well as to spread that cost among not only new gun purchasers,
but all gun owners, states should impose a property tax on fire-
arms to ensure the comprehensiveness of the firearms tax. A
property tax, imposed on all guns within the taxing jurisdiction,
creates a broader base for taxation, allowing a lower rate of tax
per gun than an excise tax. An excise tax rate standing alone
would have to be higher because it would only apply to retail
sales, and would only tax a given firearm once.2 25 It also spreads
the cost out over the lifetime of the gun, rather than trying to
capture the full externalities of a gun's potential decades of life
at a single point in time.
In its simplest form, the property tax aspect of the firearms
tax would be set by calculating the cost of gun violence within
the taxing jurisdiction and dividing it by the number of guns in
the jurisdiction. That would yield a per gun tax owed by gun
owners on each gun they own.
Of course, as a practical matter, calculating the tax is more
complicated than that. It requires determining how much gun
violence costs and how many guns exist within the taxing juris-
diction. As I have pointed out, calculating the cost of gun violence
is a complicated endeavor.226 In addition, it requires knowing
how many guns exist within the taxing jurisdiction. Currently,
the federal government does not have a comprehensive database
of firearms, and federal law would make it practically impossible
to assemble, even if the federal government had the political will
to create one. 2 2 7 By contrast, a handful of states require the reg-
istration of some or all firearms.22 8 The Supreme Court has im-
plicitly acknowledged the constitutionality of state gun registra-
tion requirements. 229
225. If the excise tax were imposed on secondary market sales, it might reach
a firearm multiple times. Still, the excise tax would apply rarely at best.
226. See supra Part I.
227. See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Empire Strikes Back: The District of Co-
lumbia's Post-Heller Firearm Registration System, 81 TENN. L. REV. 571, 579
(2014).
228. Registration, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (2019) http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun
-laws/policy-areas/gun-owner-responsibilities/registration/ [https://perma.cc/
4E6C-LFWA].
229. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) ("Assuming that
Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the
District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license
to carry it in the home.").
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But while determining the cost of gun violence and the num-
ber of guns can be difficult, neither problem should prove insur-
mountable. To calculate the societal cost of gun violence, a legis-
lature would first need to determine which costs counted. I
would include three: the costs of medical care to victims, the cost
of repairing or replacing property damaged, and the additional
marginal cost of first responders.
The first two costs present little difficulty in calculating. The
third, however, requires a certain amount of judgment. After all,
not all police action imposes additional cost. A salaried police of-
ficer gets paid the same whether she is making an arrest or writ-
ing a report. There is no obvious cost difference between her re-
sponding to gun violence or responding to a traffic accident. But
sometimes gun violence can impose an additional marginal cost.
Most obviously, where the gun violence requires hiring addi-
tional first responders or paying them overtime those costs can
be clearly traced to gun violence. 230
To determine the amount of revenue the property tax should
raise, I recommend taking a three-year rolling average of the
costs of gun violence less the amounts raised by the excise tax. 2 31
In other words, the total amount of revenue to be raised should
be calculated by adding the relevant costs for the last three
years, subtracting the amount of revenue the excise tax has pro-
vided, and dividing that amount by three.
230. For example, during the first weekend of August 2018, seventy-four
people were shot in Chicago, and twelve were killed as a result of gun violence.
In response, the city deployed 600 additional officers the following weekend.
Those officers had regular days off canceled. Sean Lewis & Courtney Gousman,
CPD Deploying 600 Officers to Violence Plagued Neighborhoods This Weekend,
WGN9 (Aug. 7, 2018), https://wgntv.com/2018/08/07/cpd-deploying-600-officers
-to-violence-plagued-neighborhoods-this-weekend/ [https://perma.cc/S6TY
-S74Q]. Though the city said it was funding them through sources other than
overtime, that additional surge in officers was directly caused by gun violence,
and should be included in the costs. Similarly, the overtime costs in the 2017
Las Vegas mass shooting ran into the millions of dollars. Caroline Bleakley,
Nevada to Receive $2. 1M to Cover Police Overtime Costs for 1 October Shooting,
8NOW.coM (Jun. 25, 2018), https://www.8newsnow.com/news/nevada-to
-receive-21m-to-cover-police-overtime-costs-for-1-october-shooting/ [https://
perma.cc/56TY-S74Q].
231. The goal of the firearms taxes is to reimburse society for the costs im-
posed by gun violence. In my proposal, the amount raised by the excise tax has
no direct connection with the total externalities caused by gun violence. But
using those amounts to reduce the property tax portion of the firearms tax en-
sures that the amount of tax tracks the costs of gun violence.
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Using a three-year rolling average provides two major ben-
efits. The first is it smooths the amount of the tax, ensuring that
an outlier year does not radically increase or decrease the
amount of tax individuals pay. The second is it allows the tax to
reflect the direction of gun violence: as gun violence increases, it
becomes more expensive to own a gun; as gun violence decreases,
the tax per gun also decreases.
Determining the number of firearms subject to the tax re-
quires a state to have a database of firearms. For purposes of the
tax, it does not matter whether the database associates the fire-
arms with individual owners or not. The important thing is
knowing how many guns are within the taxing jurisdiction, and
thus, what to use as the divisor. In large part, unless the taxing
jurisdiction has a comprehensive list of firearms already, creat-
ing a database will require the voluntary compliance of gun own-
ers.232
Of course, not all gun owners will voluntarily comply. To en-
courage compliance, there needs to be a penalty for failing to pay
the firearm property tax. The penalty should be severe enough
that it provides real incentive for gun owners to comply with the
tax. At the very least, if the taxing authority discovers a firearm
on which tax has not been paid, the owner should be required to
pay the unpaid tax plus interest.233 In addition, the law should
subject her to a penalty for nonpayment, one that increases over
time.2 34 Finally, in egregious cases of nonpayment, gun owners
232. In the language of tax administration, "voluntary compliance" does not
mean that taxpayers volunteer to pay their taxes. Rather, it acknowledges that
the tax-collecting agency lacks the capacity to directly assess all taxes or to re-
view all tax returns. Instead, it relies on taxpayers to assess their own tax lia-
bility, file necessary returns, and pay the amount due. J. T. Manhire, What Does
Voluntary Tax Compliance Mean?: A Government Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 11, 17 (2015).
233. The unpaid tax would go back to when she acquired the firearm or when
the firearm tax went into effect, whichever date is later. To determine the in-
terest rate, the state could follow the federal government's lead. For underpay-
ment of federal taxes, the interest rate is the federal short-term rate plus three
percentage points. I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) (2012). The IRS issues its short-term rate
each calendar quarter. Id. § 6621(b).
234. For example, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a five-percent penalty
on underpayments of tax where the underpayment lasts for one month or less.
Each month, the penalty increases by another five-percent, up to a maximum
penalty of twenty-five percent. Id. § 665 1(a)(1). How high should the penalty for
failure to pay the firearms tax be? Probably higher than twenty-five percent.
Until the state is aware of a gun's existence, it is relatively easy to hide the gun,
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should face criminal liability. 235 Making it costly to evade the tax
should encourage gun owners to take the steps necessary to pay
their firearms taxes. Those steps include disclosing their gun
ownership, which is especially important if they purchase their
guns out of state, make their own guns, or otherwise acquire
their guns in a manner that would be difficult for the state to
discover.
While stiff penalties should decrease noncompliance with
the firearms tax, some firearms owners will nonetheless fail to
comply. It is at least plausible that those who pay their firearms
tax are less likely to engage in costly violence than those who
evade the tax. 2 36 Even assuming that the percentage of taxes
that law-abiding gun owners pay will significantly exceed the
percentage of financial cost they impose on society, it is still fair
that they face this tax, for at least two reasons.
First, while they do not personally impose costs on society,
they nonetheless benefit from the current regime that allows for
negative externalities. Because the cost of firearm ownership
does not include the costs of gun violence, even law-abiding gun
owners pay less for their guns than the cost of guns. 2 3 7 The
meaning it is relatively easy to evade the gun tax. Professor Raskolnikov points
out that, to set the optimal deterrence, tax penalties should take into account
the "probability of detection." Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Tax-
ation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
569, 571 (2006). Tax evasion that is harder to detect should face higher penalties
than tax evasion that is easier to detect. Id.
235. To look at federal tax law one more time: the difference between civil
and criminal tax avoidance is mens rea. It is a felony to "willfully" attempt to
evade or defeat tax. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (2012). Where the attempt is willful
(and thus criminal), in addition to the civil penalties, taxpayers face a fine of up
to $100,000 and imprisonment of up to five years. Id. That same idea of willful-
ness could draw a line between failure to pay that resulted solely civil penalties
and failure to pay that also resulted in criminal liability.
236. It is not, of course, certain that this is the case. There is some evidence
of a correlation between 'law-abidance" and unwillingness to engage in tax eva-
sion. Marta Orviska & John Hudson, Tax Evasion, Civic Duty and the Law
Abiding Citizen, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 83, 93 (2002). But that evidence is
merely that individuals who believe in law-abidance are more likely to be un-
willing to engage in tax evasion than we would otherwise expect, not that they
were completely unwilling to evade taxes. Id.
237. This is because the cost of guns is largely unrelated to the likelihood
that a buyer will use the gun for violent purposes. A retail firearms dealer does
not-and, in fact, cannot-set a price based on the buyer's propensity to break
the law. Rather, the dealer sells the gun based on the ordinary supply and de-
mand curves, setting a price that applies to any buyer.
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Pigouvian firearms tax corrects that mispricing, by requiring
gun owners to internalize the full cost of firearm ownership.
While it misprices the amount of negative externality that any
given firearm owner imposes on society, determining that cost
on a person-by-person basis would be administratively impossi-
ble. It makes sense, then, to impose the tax on a proportional
basis. 238
This leads to the second reason the tax is fair, even if it falls
more heavily on law-abiding firearms owners than it does on
those who actually impose costs on society: a firearm owner who
does not want to pay the tax can easily avoid liability. Assume
that a firearm owner complies completely with the law. In fact,
she not only complies with the law, but she complies with best
practices, keeping her gun secure in such a way that not only
will she never use it to impose costs on society, but that nobody
else will be able to use it to impose such costs. As such, the fire-
arms taxes she pays make up for costs she did not cause.
At the same time, some firearm owners act violently and im-
pose financial costs on society. In a perfect world, those owners
would pay the costs they impose. For various reasons, though,
they are unable to fully internalize these costs. As a result, tax-
payers bear those costs. 2 3 9 In this stylized example, then, an in-
nocent party is going to pay costs that she did not impose. The
innocent firearm owner has at least two ways to legally avoid
those costs if she is unwilling to bear them, though. She can ei-
ther get rid of her firearms or she can move to a jurisdiction that
does not impose a firearms tax. If she is unwilling to move or
part with her firearms, she has accepted that living in the juris-
diction and owning firearms is worth more to her than the cost
of the tax.
Even though calculating the amount of tax per gun is rela-
tively mechanical, it still requires some amount of judgment. In
some cases, either where there are significant costs or few guns,
the amount of tax could potentially be unconstitutionally draco-
nian.2 40 To avoid the risk of a firearm tax violating the Second
238. It is worth noting that sin taxes work like this. The amount of tax a
purchaser pays is determined by the amount of alcohol or tobacco she purchases,
irrespective of her personal propensity to drive drunk, or her personal likelihood
of getting cancer or emphysema.
239. See supra Part I.
240. In New Jersey, for example, the Giffords Law Center calculated that
gun violence in New Jersey imposes $1.2 billion of direct costs annually.
646 [ 104:605
PAYING FOR GUN VIOLENCE
Amendment right to bear arms, a legislature needs to include a
per gun ceiling in its legislation. 241 If, in any year, the calculated
GIFFORDS LAW CENTER., THE ECONOMIC COST OF GUN VIOLENCE IN NEW JER-
SEY: A BUSINESS CASE FOR ACTION 9 (2019), https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp
-content/uploads/2018/04/Cost-of-Gun-Violence-in-New-JerseyFull-Report_4
.20.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6F6-ACQX]. According to the ATF, in 2017, there
were 57,507 registered firearms in New Jersey. ATF, STATISTICAL UPDATE, su-
pra note 156, at 15. To fully internalize the costs would require a tax of almost
$21,000 per firearm, an amount that would clearly violate gun owners' Second
Amendment right to bear arms. The $21,000 figure is almost certainly too high.
New Jersey probably has more than just 57,507 guns. And about 76% of the cost
the $1.2 billion of cost-$918 million-is lost income. GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra,
at 11. A state could certainly calculate the costs of gun violence differently than
the Giffords Law Center does. But the fact remains that even if we only include
the $224 million of healthcare and police and criminal justice costs, id., the re-
sultant tax would be almost $4,000 per gun.
241. There is clearly no bright line where the tax becomes draconian. And,
in fact, historically, gun taxes could be significant. The National Firearms Act
that created that ten- and eleven-percent transfer tax on certain firearms and
ammunition, see supra notes 188-91, created an alternative tax for certain
types of firearms. Machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, silencers, and a
handful of other kinds of firearms are exempt from the normal transfer tax.
I.R.C. §§ 4182(a), 5845(a) (2012). Instead, transferors pay a tax of $200 on these
kinds of firearms. Id. § 5811(a). While $200 does not necessarily sound exces-
sive, the amount was not indexed to inflation. It has been $200 since the Na-
tional Firearms Act was enacted in 1934. National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No.
73-474, § 3(a), 48 Stat. 1236, 1237 (1934). Had the tax been adjusted for infla-
tion, it would be roughly $3,700 today. McClelland, supra note 190. And, in fact,
Senators and Representatives recognized that the purpose of this excise tax was
to allow Congress to use its taxing power to regulate the "evil" of machine guns
and sawed-off shotguns. Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second
Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597, 611 (1995). And the legislative history
was even more explicit about the regulatory purpose behind the tax:
The gangster as a law violator must be deprived of his most dangerous
weapon, the machine gun. Your committee is of the opinion that limit-
ing the bill to the taxing of sawed-off guns and machine guns is suffi-
cient at this time. It is not thought necessary to go so far as to include
pistols and revolvers and sporting arms. But while there is justification
for permitting the citizen to keep a pistol or revolver for his own pro-
tection without any restriction, there is no reason why anyone except a
law officer should have a machine gun or sawed-off shotgun.
H.R. REP. NO. 1780, at 1 (1934). Of course, the fact that Congress enacted a
draconian tax on sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, silencers, and similar fire-
arms tells us nothing about the permissible line for imposing a tax on all fire-
arms today. In the first place, Heller was decades from being decided when Con-
gress enacted the National Firearms Act. In the second place, Heller's guidance
likely would not have applied to machine guns and sawed-off shotguns even had
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cost per gun exceeds the ceiling, the government will collect less
revenue than it needs. It can recoup that in future years by keep-
ing the tax at the ceiling amount until it has made up for the
shortfall.
C. EARMARKING REVENUES
Although the bulk of this Article has been dedicated to the
design of an appropriate tax system, how state governments use
the revenue from the firearms tax is just as critical as the meth-
ods they use to raise it.242 Here, because the goal of the firearms
tax is to compensate third parties for the costs gun violence im-
poses on them, the revenue from the firearms tax must be ear-
marked exclusively to pay for those costs. 2 4 3
Governments commonly earmark taxes imposed on a nar-
row base. For example, "airline ticket tax revenue is designated
for spending on airports, air traffic control, and other aviation-
related infrastructure," while revenue from gas taxes pays for
its analysis been in place. Those were guns used by law enforcement and gang-
sters, not guns commonly used for self-defense. See supra note 82 and accompa-
nying text.
242. Cf. KLEINBARD, supra note 27, at xxii ("Tax policy is the handmaiden,
and spending policy the sovereign.").
243. It is worth pointing out that, although gun violence imposes very clear
costs on society, some people could argue that guns also provide positive exter-
nalities (that is, benefits to society that aren't full internalized by gun owners).
Many gun owners believe that they carry guns, not merely for self-defense, but
"as a way to claim their right to self-protection and as representing a duty to
protect others." JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-PROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY
POLITICS OF GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE 96 (2015). And even without explicitly
protecting others, John R. Lott, Jr. argues that broad gun ownership has signif-
icant positive externalities, with gun owners bearing the full cost of gun owner-
ship while "receiv[ing] only a small fraction of the total benefits." JOHN R. LOTT,
JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL
LAWS 119 (3d ed. 2010). He asserts that every one-percent increase in gun own-
ership saves victims more than $3 billion. Id. The "more guns, less crime" thesis
has been tremendously controversial, and Lott's conclusions have been criti-
cized on a number of grounds. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, The
Latest Misfires in Support of the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1371, 1398 (2003) ("We feel confident concluding that we have indeed
shot down the more guns, less crime hypothesis."). Deciding whether guns pro-
vide positive externalities, and if so, the amount of those externalities is beyond
the scope of this article, however. It is sufficient to say that, if a state legislature
believes that gun ownership creates positive externalities, it can also legislate
that, by, for instance, reducing the amount of tax on firearms or providing a tax
subsidy for firearm ownership.
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highways. 244 And, as a practical matter, there is evidence that
earmarking tax revenues "reduces resistance to paying taxes."245
But beyond the potential for reducing resistance, there is a
compelling legal reason to earmark revenue from the firearms
tax: it underscores the tax's relationship to actual costs imposed
by guns. If the revenue from the firearms tax went into a state's
general revenue basket it would be hard to make an argument
for why the tax was on such a limited-and constitutionally-pro-
tected-base. 246 A broader base, even with lower rates, could
raise at least as much revenue, without being aimed at a partic-
ular product.
But earmarking the revenues establishes a reason why the
tax is aimed specifically at the ownership of firearms. The state
will not use the revenues broadly; instead, it will use them to pay
for specific costs imposed by firearms. That connection should
bolster a state's argument that the tax is not a punitive measure
that infringes on gun owners' constitutional rights, but rather
acts as a remedial measure meant to correct a specific negative
externality.
And how would earmarking work? Broadly, a state govern-
ment would establish a fund from the revenues raised by the
firearms taxes. The state would use that fund to pay for first re-
sponder overtime that resulted from gun violence. In addition,
individuals who suffered gun violence-related costs could receive
reimbursement from the fund. The fund would reimburse the
types of injuries the law used to calculate the per gun tax.2 4 7
Using a government fund to reimburse the costs of negative
externalities would not be unique to the firearms tax. Most no-
tably, in 1986, the federal government created the National Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Program. 248 The Program was insti-
tuted to protect vaccine manufacturers from liability claims that
244. BURMAN & SLEMROD, supra note 99, at 96.
245. Margaret Wilkinson, Paying for Public Spending: Is There a Role for
Earmarked Taxes?, 15 FISCAL STUD. 119, 122 (1994).
246. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
247. For example, if the state calculated the cost of gun violence as including
police overtime, medical bills from gunshot injuries, and property damage from
bullets, an individual could be reimbursed for hospital bills that resulted from
a shooting. She couldn't, however, receive reimbursement for lost wages, be-
cause the state did not include lost wages in calculating the amount of the tax
on firearms.
248. Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National
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could inhibit their ability to produce necessary vaccines, while
compensating individuals who suffered unpreventable harms
from vaccination. 24 9 An individual who suffers vaccine-related
harms covered by the Program files a petition in the Court of
Federal Claims.250 A successful petitioner receives compensation
from a trust fund funded by an excise tax on vaccines. 251 A peti-
tioner who accepts compensation from the trust fund is barred
from filing a civil claim against vaccine manufacturers. 2 5 2
While the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
can serve as a model for the compensation of victims of gun vio-
lence, there are some details that would necessarily differ. In the
first instance, accepting compensation should not foreclose an
injured party's ability to sue the shooter. The federal govern-
ment recognized the importance of having vaccines, but litiga-
tion risk "led manufacturers and investors to question whether
vaccines were financially worthwhile." 253 Creating this quasi-no-
fault-insurance regime largely eliminated the litigation risk, re-
ducing the cost to manufacturers producing vaccines. The gov-
ernment does not, however, need to provide incentives to shoot-
ers to impose costs on society. To the extent a shooter has
resources that could reimburse victims of her gun violence, vic-
tims should have recourse against those assets. 254
In addition, the funds should be distributed through an ad-
ministrative, not judicial, proceeding. It makes sense that the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program would require
a judicial proceeding; vaccine claims, while filed in the Court of
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 59, 62
(1999).
249. Id.
250. Efthimios Parasidis, Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, 97 B.U. L. REV.
2153, 2211 (2017).
251. Ridgway, supra note 248, at 62.
252. Id. at 63.
253. Parasidis, supra note 250, at 2208.
254. Allowing individuals to sue the shooter does create some mixed incen-
tives. If a victim can collect both from the government-administered fund and
the shooter, she can be reimbursed twice for the same injury. If, on the other
hand, she has to reduce the amount she receives from the fund by the amount
she receives in a civil suit, she loses the incentive to sue the shooter, and the
shooter may not face financial liability for the shooting. Perhaps the ideal solu-
tion would be to prohibit victims of gun violence who are compensated by the
trust fund from suing the shooter, but provide that the fund has standing to sue
the shooter for amounts it has paid out.
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Federal Claims, are adjudicated by special masters. 255 The spe-
cial masters who oversee vaccine claims "were intended to be ex-
pert decisionmakers with substantial knowledge of vaccine inju-
ries and substantial authority to structure how each case
proceeds." 256 Vaccines require knowledgeable decisionmakers,
and semi-adversarial proceedingS 257 because the causality be-
tween vaccines and injuries is complex and takes significant ef-
fort to evaluate. 258
Demonstrating injury and causality stemming from gun vi-
olence is far less complicated. While there may be situations
where the injury is attenuated, in most cases an individual can
easily demonstrate that she has been injured by gun violence.
An administrative process should allow for sufficient oversight
of the trust fund and allow for simpler compensation for victims
of gun violence. As long as a claimant can demonstrate a harm
caused by a firearm, and document the costs of that harm, the
fund should generally reimburse the claimant for the harm she
suffered.
That reimbursement must face a couple caveats, however.
One caveat is when reimbursement is not appropriate. Clearly,
if the trust fund operates at the state or local level, it is not going
to reimburse all harms stemming from gun violence. If Califor-
nia were to impose a firearms tax and Texas were to decline to
impose one, it would make very little sense for the California
trust fund to reimburse all victims of a shooting in Texas, for
example.
A legislature enacting a firearms tax and earmarked trust
fund would have to decide which damages to reimburse and who
qualifies for reimbursement. Because the tax is imposed on all
gun owners within a particular jurisdiction, I suggest that the
trust fund reimburse residents of the jurisdiction-and only res-
idents-irrespective of where their injuries occur.
To do this, of course, a state or local jurisdiction has to define
who qualifies as a resident. Many states already have statutes
255. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1) (2012).
256. Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 807 (2011).
257. Id. at 806.
258. The petitioner in a vaccine case has the burden of proof to demonstrate
a compensable vaccine-related injury. Parasidis, supra note 250, at 2214. The
petitioner must substantiate her claims by medical records or medical opinion
and must include relevant medical records with her petition. Id.
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that define residency.2 59 The Supreme Court has held that con-
stitutionally "a jurisdiction . . . may tax all the income of its res-
idents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction." 260
Although states' definitions of residency differ, nearly half define
an individual as a resident if she has a "permanent place of
abode" in the state and is physically present in the state for a set
amount of time.261 Other states look at permanent place of
abode, without regard to actual physical presence, or actual
physical presence without reference to abode. 262 For purposes of
determining a victim of gun violence's eligibility to make a claim
against the trust fund, states could use precisely the same defi-
nition of residency that they use for personal income tax pur-
poses.
As a practical matter, allowing residents to make claims
against the fund means that if California were to enact the fire-
arms tax, and a California resident was injured in another state,
the injured Californian could claim reimbursement from the
state's firearms tax trust fund.2 6 3 At the same time, the inverse
should be true: the trust fund should not reimburse non-resi-
dents for their injuries stemming from gun violence. 264
Allowing residents, but not nonresidents, access to the ear-
marked fund is an intuitive result when a non-resident is injured
outside of the jurisdiction with the trust fund. But it is equally
necessary when a non-resident is injured within the jurisdic-
tion. 2 6 5 If the injured individual resides in a jurisdiction with a
259. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to
Eliminate the Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the
Proposed Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533, 543-44 (2014).
260. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-63 (1995).
261. Zelinsky, supra note 259, at 543-44.
262. Id. at 544.
263. This is not an unrealistic hypothetical. More than half of the individuals
killed in the 2017 Las Vegas mass shooting appear to have been California res-
idents. Alan Gomez & Kaila White, Here Are All the Victims of the Las Vegas
Shooting, USA TODAY (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2017/10/06/here-all-victims-las-vegas-shooting/733236001/ [https://
perma.cc/56GQ-SWSE]. If California had a trust fund and Nevada did not, the
California residents should be able to get reimbursed for their injuries.
264. That means that if Nevada instituted a firearms tax and California did
not, those Californians injured in the 2017 shooting would have no recourse in
the firearms tax trust fund, but residents of Nevada could claim a reimburse-
ment.
265. It is important that the legislature not limit reimbursement to residents
merely to discriminate against non-residents. The privileges and immunities
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similar firearms tax and trust fund, she can claim reimburse-
ment from her jurisdiction of residence. But if a taxing jurisdic-
tion will reimburse anybody injured within its boundaries, it po-
tentially sets up a free-rider problem, reducing the incentive for
other jurisdictions to impose a firearms tax and trust fund.2 6 6
Even where the person and the injury qualify for reimburse-
ment, the administrator of the trust fund must determine the
amount to be reimbursed. The legislature cannot anticipate any
given year's costs stemming from gun violence when setting the
rate. Using a three-year rolling average merely provides an ap-
proximation of the likely amount of negative externalities gun
ownership will cause during a given year. 2 6 7 If gun violence
spikes, the trust fund may not have enough money to reimburse
all of the costs. In addition, because the legislature needs to
avoid imposing a draconian tax, it may (deliberately) raise less
revenue than it needs to fully fund the trust fund.268
During a year when claims against the trust fund exceed the
amount in the trust fund, each claimant should only receive a
pro rata portion of her claim.269 The number of unpaid claims
would roll over to the next year and be added to the three-year
rolling average, subject to the per-gun cap. In addition, the
amount by which claimants were underpaid would roll over to
clause of the Constitution bars discrimination against non-residents if there is
no substantial reason for the discrimination. "But it does not preclude disparity
of treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent
reasons for it." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). And what qualifies
as a valid reason? The Supreme Court has held, for example, that preferential
tuition for state residents meets the constitutional bar because it "furthers the
substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are
enjoyed only by residents." Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983). Simi-
larly, the legislature would have to explain that it limited the pool of potential
claimants to residents of the jurisdiction because the costs of gun violence ulti-
mately fell on the taxpayers of the jurisdiction.
266. Alternatively, of course, a jurisdiction could choose to pay for any inju-
ries that occur within its boundaries and not pay for injuries that occur outside
its boundaries, irrespective of victims' residence. That seems unfair, though:
residents of the jurisdiction are subject to the tax when they buy or own fire-
arms, where nonresidents are not. Moreover, it is residents whose taxes pay for
the externalities caused by gun violence within the jurisdiction, so the firearms
tax is intended, in part, to alleviate those taxpayers' costs.
267. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
269. Mathematically, that means that if the fund has $750,000, and there
are $1 million of claims against it, each claimant will receive seventy-five per-
cent of the amount she claims.
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the next year and become a claim for that year, equal in priority
to claims that arose in that year. 270 If, in any given year, the
firearms tax revenue exceeded claims against the trust fund, the
surplus would roll over to pay claims in subsequent years.
These caveats-that a victim who files a claim against the
trust fund must be a resident of the jurisdiction and that in some
cases the claims will not match the amount of revenue the trust
fund has raised-do not undercut the ability of an administra-
tive agency to administer the trust fund. For the most part, ques-
tions of residence and amount can be resolved administratively.
In the marginal case, where amount, causation, or residence is
less clear, the legislature can provide for an administrative or
judicial appeals process. It is not necessary, however, to start
with the complexity and expense that a semi-adversarial judicial
process would require.
D. BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
Before addressing possible behavioral effects of a firearms
tax, it is important to emphasize that the principal purpose be-
hind the tax is not to change behavior. It is unlikely that impos-
ing a reasonable Pigouvian tax on firearms and ammunition will
meaningfully reduce gun violence, and the tax is certainly not
intended to "punish[] innocent and responsible gun owners;" 271
for that matter, it is not intended to punish guilty and irrespon-
sible gun owners. Instead, the principal goal of this proposed
firearms tax is to raise revenue to pay for the societal costs of
gun violence. Because there is no correlation between individu-
als' demand elasticities and the social cost they will impose, a
general Pigouvian tax will be too blunt an instrument to mean-
ingfully modify individuals' behavior in a targeted manner.272
Still, the firearms tax is likely to cause some behavioral
change. In the first instance, because it forces gun owners to in-
ternalize a higher percentage of the costs of gun ownership, it
270. For instance, imagine that in Year 1, the fund has $750,000, and there
are 100 claims against the fund for $10,000 each. Each claimant will be reim-
bursed $7,500. In Year 2, the three-year rolling average is $800,000. The state
will add the $250,000 to the $800,000, and divide the $1.05 million dividend by
the number of guns in the taxing jurisdiction. At the same time, each of the 100
individuals has a new claim in Year 2 for $2,500, which will be added to new
claims arising in Year 2.
271. Kobayashi, supra note 112, at 320.
272. Fleischer, supra note 9, at 1703.
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may correct market failures to some extent by discouraging in-
dividuals from purchasing too many firearms. It is not clear,
however, that even this behavioral modification will be meaning-
ful. There is some empirical evidence that hunting demand is
relatively indifferent to changes in hunting fees. 2 7 3 Of course,
hunting fees are different from broad-based taxes, and hunters'
elasticities may differ from other gun users', so it is difficult to
draw broad conclusions about the effectiveness of a Pigouvian
tax at reducing the number of guns individuals acquire.2 74 Still,
it is at least possible that a firearms tax will have little effect on
the rate of gun ownership.
In addition, a firearms tax may encourage gun owners to
support policies that will reduce gun violence in the aggregate.
Because the tax is calculated by dividing the costs of gun violence
by the number of guns in the taxing jurisdiction, there are two
ways to reduce the per gun tax. One, of course, is to increase the
number of guns in the jurisdiction. Because the number of guns
and the amount of gun violence are correlated, though,275 in-
creasing the number of guns could potentially increase the cost
of gun violence.
The second way to reduce the per gun tax is to decrease the
cost of gun violence. Less cost, spread over the same number of
guns, will also reduce the per gun tax. For the most part, indi-
vidual gun owners' personal behavior likely has little effect on
the total cost of gun violence in a state. But the possibility of
reducing their tax bill could provide an additional incentive for
gun owners to support reasonable firearm regulation. For exam-
ple, a gun owner who stores her guns securely in a gun safe can
do little to reduce the chances that her guns are used to inflict
externalities on others; and she currently has limited incentive
to support legislation that would require individuals to store
their firearms securely.
But if she paid a firearms tax, and the amount were based
on the historic cost of gun violence in her jurisdiction, she may
have an incentive to support regulation requiring all gun owners
to store their firearms securely. That type of regulation would
273. Firearm and Ammunition Taxes, RAND CORPORATION (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.rand.org/researchlgun-policy/analysis/essays/firearm-and
-ammunition-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/7CN-M7CU].
274. Id.
275. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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not impose any additional costs on her as a responsible gun
owner because she already meets its requirements, but it could
reduce the overall costs of gun violence by reducing gun thefts
and suicides, thus ultimately lowering her tax bill. The imposi-
tion of this firearms tax would give responsible gun owners in-
centive to support this type of no-additional-cost regulation.
CONCLUSION
Gun violence in the United States is an enormous, and
costly, problem. It has no easy solution. Limiting individuals'
ability to own firearms faces significant cultural, political, and
constitutional impediments, impediments that are unique to the
United States. 276 The uniqueness of United States gun culture
means that solutions to gun violence that work elsewhere may
not be viable in the United States.277
That is not to say there is nothing we can do to address gun
violence. The Supreme Court left the door open to some level of
regulation, though lower courts differ on where to draw the line.
As Congress and the states attempt to figure out how they can
address gun violence in a constitutionally- and politically-viable
way, though, there is something states can do to ameliorate the
costs gun violence imposes on society: enact a firearms tax.
The tax will not end gun violence; it may not even impact
the amount of such violence. But, properly designed, with reve-
nues earmarked appropriately, this type of tax will at least shift
the financial cost of gun violence from innocent victims to gun
owners themselves. And while the shifting is imperfect because
gun owners whose guns will never be used to commit violence
will pay the same amount of taxes per gun as those whose guns
inflict significant damage, it is impossible to know in advance
how much negative externality each gun owner will impose on
society. Because the purpose of my proposed firearms tax is pri-
marily to make society financially whole, and not to reduce gun
violence, it is unimportant to determine just how much expense
276. See, e.g., Glenn H. Utter & James L. True, The Evolving Gun Culture
in America, J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES, Summer 2000, at 67, 70.
277. For instance, gun control advocates like to point to Australia which, af-
ter a mass shooting, effectively banned all semiautomatic weapons. See Clifton
Leaf, How Australia All But Ended Gun Violence, FORTUNE (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/02/20/australia-gun-control-success/ [https://perma.cc/
R6S2-JNG9]. But, as we have seen, the blanket ban on a class of guns is likely
to violate individuals' Second Amendment right to bear arms.
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each gun owner will cause. As long as gun owners as a class in-
ternalize the costs of gun violence, society does not have to bear
them.
It is important to keep in mind that the financial cost of gun
violence, while both real and significant, is far from its only cost.
And financial reimbursement for the costs of medical care do not
undo the pain or death that firearms can cause. While we can
quantify pain and death,2 78 reimbursement does not make the
pain or death go away. The taxing and reimbursement regime I
propose is by no means a substitute for substantive regulation of
firearms.
Until that regulation occurs, though, a firearms tax can at
least reduce the social costs of gun ownership and reduce the
market failures related to firearm ownership. The constitutional
impediments to a firearms tax are lower than for regulation, and
the constitutional contours are far clearer. Additionally, done at
the state level, the firearms tax benefits from an easier political
atmosphere, at least in some states, and the natural experiment
that federalism allows.
278. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Dam-
ages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 168 (2004) (noting that in
tort law, compensatory damages include damages "based on the noneconomic
effects of victim's pain and suffering").
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